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PRESENTATION
This is the fifth year that the weekly dispatches transmitted 
during a year, by ECLAC Washington to ECLAC Santiago and to other 
subregional offices, are gathered in a single document.1
For their presentation here, the dispatches are classified by 
subject and ordered chronologically within each chapter, with each 
heading indicating the relative saliency of those issues within the 
international economic agenda.
The three most important issues which dominated the 
international economic agenda, throughout the concluding year, are 
listed here according to what, avowedly, is a very subjective 
ordering of their relative importance.
First, 1991 will be recorded as the year of the 
universalization of the Bretton Woods institutions. Commenting on 
the participation of a delegation from the Soviet Union in the 
Bangkok annual meetings, the Managing Director of the IMF, Michel 
Camdessus said, for these institutions, Ma long-awaited 
opportunity...to become truly universal...is drawing close." This 
was only the culmination of a process by which, in less than a 
year, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and Namibia joined the 
Bank and the Fund, with Albania and Switzerland requesting their 
admission as well. Thus, 1991 saw the completion of what Albert 
Hirschman foresaw almost ten years ago and baptized as "the triumph 
of monoeconomics," proving that as with physics, "there is only one 
economics."
Second, the recession in the United States was not news in 
1991, because it started in the last quarter of last year and 
continued into the first quarter of this year, with only a slight 
decline experienced during the second quarter. What became news in 
1991 was that the weakness of the recovery was unable to lift 
consumer confidence and to stop the increase in jobless claims. 
Consequently, by the end of the year the sluggishness of the 
economic recovery in the United States began to take its toll. The 
rate of approval of the President's handling of the economy was 
falling, clouding his prospects for re-election next year.
1 ECLAC, International Economic Highlights 1987 (LC/WAS/L.2) 
17 August 1988; 1988 (LC/WAS/L4) 17 March 1989; 1989 (LC/WAS/L.8) 
15 March 1990; 1990 (LC/WAS/L.11) 22 March 1991.
Finally, no major achievements were registered in 
international trade, largely because the stalemate in the Uruguay 
Round negotiation, caused by agricultural subsidies, was overcome 
only by the end of the year. However, this did not preclude other 
developments, such as the opening of negotiations between Canada, 
Mexico and the United States to create a North American Free Trade 
Area, which by the end of the year appeared stalled because of the 
weakness of the recovery in the U.S. economy.
Some of these issues were described in the dispatches 
transmitted regularly during the year. They are gathered here with 
the purpose of making them available for easier consultation, in 
case the Washington D.C. vantage point they present still has some 
testimonial value.
To conclude, those readers who are not familiarized with them 
should be reminded that each dispatch tries to remain within the 
self-imposed limit of 750 words, because their purpose is only to 
bring an issue to the reader's attention.
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I. THE WORLD ECONOMY
I. 1. 1991 LOOKS BLEAK (16 JANUARY 1991 WDW/1/91)
Three basic factors are contributing to the world economy's 
bleak outlook for 1991. First and foremost there is the prospect of 
war; second the recession in the United States; and third the 
stagnation of the trade talks around the issue of agricultural 
subsidies.
The immediate consequences of an armed conflict in the Middle 
East are only beginning to be sorted out. Despite the highest level 
of petroleum stocks in the industrialized nations since 1982, as 
well as the promise that these stocks will be swiftly released, oil 
prices are predicted to immediately soar up to $75 a barrel in the 
event of war. A relatively more optimistic forecast, in the short- 
run, sees an oil glut developing, if and when the war is short.
Another immediate victim will be the dollar exchange rate, 
also expected to soar in the case of war, or to drop abruptly in 
the case of peace.
Finally, financing the military buildup in the Persian Gulf 
has already cost $10 billion, with foreign governments contributing 
an estimated $6 billion. Additionally, the administration estimates 
that the U.S. will have to spend almost $30 billion in 1991, to 
sustain the present levels of military presence in the Gulf, an 
estimate that does not include the actual cost of fighting a war.
Expenditures in the Persian Gulf are exempt from the spending 
limits agreed recently in the budget deficit reduction package, but 
they still drain federal resources. Thus, recently released White 
House estimates reveal that the federal budget deficit will reach 
between $300 and 325 billion during the current fiscal year.
Compounding the present bleakness, the outbreak of war in the 
Middle East is expected to have a larger impact given the present 
fragility of the U.S. economy. The length of the military 
confrontation is pondered to analyze its impact on an economy that 
the White House finally, on January 2, admitted that was in
recession. The preliminary forecast used to prepare the 1992 
federal budget shows the economy shrinking for two successive 
quarters, at a 3.4% annual rate during the fourth quarter of 1990 
and a 1.3% rate in the first quarter of 1991.
If the war is short and without major damage to oil 
production, it is projected that consumer confidence will respond 
positively, while oil prices tumble. But if the conflict lasts more 
than six months, turning into a military stalemate and oil supplies 
are affected, the scenario is for the U.S. economy to plunge into 
deeper recession, soaring inflation, climbing interest rates, 
ballooning fiscal deficits, plummeting real state values and 
collapsing consumer confidence.
In the search for signals on the duration of the recession, 
the figures for the rest of the world economy also affect 
negatively the performance of the U.S. economy. Monthly data from 
Columbia University Center for International Business Cycle 
Research reveal that a global slump is possible. Indexes of leading 
indicators are falling for Australia, Canada, Great Britain, 
France, Japan, New Zealand and Taiwan, while gains in these indexes 
appear only for Germany, Italy and South Korea. Not much hope comes 
from the developing countries, because deflation dominates the 
perspectives of commodity prices, already at their lowest level 
since 1987, with another drop of at least 10% expected. Not even 
the threat of war in the Middle East, with the immediate price 
increases in oil and gold, will be enough to upset this overall 
deflationary trend.
Therefore, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta, Mr. Robert Forrestal, projected that in 1991 the U.S. 
economy will grow at a sluggish average of 0.5%, with an estimated 
average unemployment rate of 6.5% and the consumer price index 
between 4.5% and 5%. The "bad news" is that these projections are 
based on an annual average of $18 per barrel of oil.
Finally, the stalemate in the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations, over agricultural subsidies, points to a deepening of 
the contradictions between the United States, Germany and Japan, 
with numerous signals of the emergence of regional trading blocs as 
an alternative.
First of all, it is expected that negotiations between Canada, 
Mexico and the United States, for the creation of a North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA), will conclude successfully this year, with 
the agreement submitted to ratification during 1992. Also, signals 
are coming from the Pacific, from Malaysia and Singapore, about the 
creation of an Asian bloc to counter those that will emerge in 
North America and Europe.
5
Finally, tensions about sharing the burden in the Persian Gulf 
between Germany, Japan and the United States have generated fears 
that these will be more damaging than the military confrontation 
itself, because they will leave scars that will fuel the already 
aggravated trade tensions.
Facing this impressive list of bleak news at the beginning of 
the year, Richard Lawrence reminded the readers of his weekly 
column in the Journal of Commerce that, fortunately, for the U.S. 
President's Council of Economic Advisers, "forecasting is an 
imprecise science."
I. 2. A LONG TERM OUTLOOK FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 
(WDW/4/91 - 6 FEBRUARY 1991)
This is the title of a study, by S. Fardoust and A. 
Dhareshwar from the World Bank's International Economics 
Department, recently released as number 12 of the Policy and 
Research Series, that has gained attention probably because these 
uncertain times are scarcely propitious for long-term 
predictions.
The 1990s will be a period of fairly rapid growth for the 
high-income OECD developed countries, as well as for a number of 
developing countries, particularly the Asian newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs). This will perpetuate a "disturbing feature" of 
the eighties, called the "two-track" growth pattern of the world 
economy, by which the rest of the developing countries, of Africa 
and Latin America, exhibit less impressive growth performances and 
differ in their ability to "respond to changes in the international 
economy."
Several indicators reveal that increased interdependence 
characterized the world economy during the eighties:
- The steady increase in the ratio of trade to GDP, from 
almost 12 percent in 1965 to 19 percent in 1987 ;
- The expansion of international financial markets, outpacing 
the growth of international trade, by which "the combined average
daily volume of trade in the foreign exchange markets of Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States reached $430 billion... 
about 50 times the average daily volume of transactions in 
internationally traded goods and commodities;"
- The profound change in both the direction and composition of 
international financial flows, by which the United States and the
developing countries ceased being the main supplier and the main
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recipients, respectively, while Japan and Germany became the 
primary suppliers and the United States turned into the most 
heavily indebted country;
- The steady decline in the role of raw materials in world 
production and consumption;
- The continuing shift toward services in both production and 
trade;
- The rapid increase in the share in world trade of machinery, 
transport equipment and science-based products;
- And the concentration of trade flows within three major 
trading blocs, since "trade within the bloc as a share of total 
trade was 69 percent in Western Europe, 41 percent in North 
America, and 31 percent in East Asia."
The main "currents in the international economy," that will 
influence growth prospects, are identified as follows: First and 
foremost, the massive disequilibria among the major industrial 
countries will decisively influence interest and exchange rates, 
asset and commodity prices, and trade and financial flows. Second, 
the continued deregulation of product, labor, and financial 
markets. Third, the consequent volatility in financial and monetary 
conditions. Fourth, institutional changes in international trade, 
such as Europe 1992, the Uruguay Round and the changes in Eastern 
Europe. Fifth, the rapid pace of technological change. Sixth, a 
demographic shift that leaves the industrialized countries with 
rapidly aging populations, while the developing countries strive to 
increase labor productivity and absorb new members into the labor 
force. Seventh, increased awareness about environmental problems. 
Finally, the availability of natural resources, particularly the 
poverty-related issue of unequal access to food and agricultural 
resources, manifested in chronic food insecurity and recurrent 
famines, as well as uncertainty of supply and volatile prices of 
conventional energy sources and other strategic minerals.
A baseline scenario, as well as an alternative (low- 
productivity) scenario are presented. The key assumptions of the 
baseline scenario refer to the macroeconomic policies of industrial 
countries, particularly the fiscal and monetary policies of 
Germany, Japan and the United States, with the fiscal policy of the 
United States playing the crucial role.
The industrialized countries are expected to maintain an 
average real GDP growth of about 3 percent in the 1990s, while the 
developing countries present "a mixed picture." An increase of 2 
percent in the annual growth rate of income per capita is expected 
in the severely indebted middle income countries, based on the 
"optimistic assumption of a gradual decline in the ratio of debt 
service to exports and a resumption of positive net financial 
transfers." By contrast, the Asian newly industrialized economies 
(NIEs) are expected to grow at rates "significantly above average," 
with some of them "graduating" by the year 2000 into the ranks of
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the industrial countries. Finally, in many poor countries the 
situation will remain precarious, with per capita income in Sub- 
Saharan Africa expected to grow at a yearly average of less than 1 
percent.
The alternative low-productivity, "low-case" scenario is 
even worst.
To conclude, "the main development challenge of the 
1990s" is described as "the desperate economic situation of the 
many low-performing countries." They are advised "to stabilize 
macroeconomic conditions and revive confidence, thus encouraging 
private investment and accelerating productivity growth." Even so, 
it is admitted that "such measures have a better chance to succeed 
if they are buttressed by external financial support long enough to 
allow the domestic economy to revive."
I. 3. THE IMF1S FIRST WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (WECn 
(WDW/14/91 - 15 MAY 1991)
Every year, before the IMF-World Bank Spring meetings 
(WDW/13/91), the IMF staff makes available to the Press an advance 
copy containing excerpts of the forthcoming World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) , to be published in full by the end of May. The second WEO is 
issued later in the year, before the IMF-World Bank annual 
meetings, sometime in September.
The advance copy of the first WEO contains the following 
chapters: current developments and short term prospects, including 
a global overview, with sections for the industrial and the 
developing countries; for the first time, there is a separate 
chapter dealing with the macroeconomic developments and systemic 
reforms in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., now classified within 
the group of European developing countries, including sections on 
recent developments and prospects, as well as on the reforms in the 
domestic economy and in the external sector; key policy issues and 
medium term projections for the industrialized and the developing 
countries; finally, annexes dealing with oil prices, the potential 
output in the major industrial countries, alternative measures of 
resource flows to developing countries, and trade integration in 
the Western Hemisphere.
World economic growth is estimated to have declined from 31/4 
percent in 1989 to 2 percent in 1990, as a consequence of the 
slowdown in the industrialized countries and a fall in economic 
activity in the developing countries of Eastern Europe, the Middle 
East and the Western Hemisphere. In 1991, the world economy is
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expected to decline further, to 1 1/4 percent, due to the weakness 
of some industrialized economies, to the further decline in output 
in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe, as well as to the 
downturn in the Soviet Union.
Recovery is expected to begin in several industrial countries 
during 1991, pulling world economic expansion to 3 percent in 1992. 
Also, world trade is expected to decline from 7 percent in 1989 to 
2 1/2 percent in 1991 before rising to 5 1/2 percent in 1992.
The slowdown in the industrialized countries between 1990-91 
is attributed to the recession in the United States, Canada and the 
United Kingdom, as well as to the effects of higher real interest 
rates in Germany and Japan and to the conflict in the Middle East. 
Also, the persistence of "profound cyclical divergences" among the 
three largest industrial economies has narrowed current account 
imbalances and has reduced the risk of world-wide recession.
The U. S. recession is expected to have a relatively small 
impact on the rest of the world for several reasons. First, the 
downturn in the United States is expected to be "short and 
shallow;" second, the share of the United States in total output 
has declined; and third, in contrast with past recessions, interest 
rates are falling in the United States.
Inflationary pressures are expected to abate in the industrial 
countries, between 1991-92, as a result of lower oil prices, excess 
capacity in some countries, and the slowdown in Japan and Germany.
In the developing countries, after the significant slowdown of 
1990, growth will remain weak in 1991 before recovering to 3 1/2 
percent in 1992. The rise in oil prices, during the second half of
1990, accompanied by the decline in the prices of non-fuel primary 
commodities, has resulted in a sharp deterioration of the terms of 
trade among the majority of oil importing developing countries.
On the assumption that policy slippage can be avoided, in 
1992, a "marked improvement in economic performance" is expected 
among the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere, with 
growth reaching 3 1/4 percent and average inflation falling to 36 
percent. These short-term projections "depend crucially upon the 
success of the anti-inflation programs introduced in Argentina 
Brazil and Peru."
The medium-term projections for the industrialized countries 
are based on the following technical assumptions: unchanged 
policies; constant real effective exchange rates among the major 
currencies; and a world price of oil averaging $17.18 per barrel in
1991, rising to $17.87 per barrel in 1992 and remaining unchanged 
in real terms in subsequent years. On the basis of these 
assumptions, real GDP growth in the industrial countries is
projected to pick up from its current slow pace to a yearly average 
of 2 3/4 percent in 1991-96.
The economic situation of many indebted developing countries 
"remains a cause of concern." The medium-term projections for these 
countries depend on the persistence of macroeconomic stabilization 
and structural adjustment. However, prospects for the developing 
countries also depend on the external economic environment. 
Particularly, from growth in the industrial countries recovering to 
3 1/4 percent a year in 1993-96; from oil prices remaining in real 
terms at their 1991 average; and from non-fuel commodity prices 
rising by about 6 percent a year after 1992.
Based on these assumptions, growth for the net debtor 
developing countries as a group is projected to increase from an 
average of 3 1/2 percent a year in 1991-92 to 5 percent in the 
medium term. For the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere 
growth rates of an average of about 4 1/2 percent are considered 
attainable in the medium-term. Consequently, for the developing 
countries of the Western Hemisphere, 1991 will be another year of 
sluggish growth with an expected rebound in the medium term based 
on what presently sound as quite heroic assumptions.
I. 4. THE LONDON SUMMIT (WDW/21/90 - 24 JULY 1991)
The media blitz unleashed, last week, by the presence of 
President Gorbachev in London almost led to the belief that aid to 
the Soviet Union was the only issue of the seventeenth summit of 
the Heads of State and Government of the seven major industrialized 
economies— Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the 
representatives of the European Community.
Although the results remained far from the "grand bargain of 
dollars for democracy" (WDW/20/91), the Soviet President was able, 
in the words of British Prime Minister John Major, to obtain the 
beginning of "a process of dialogue" or, in President Gorbachev's 
terms, "the first stage of understanding."
More important still was the announcement made by Presidents 
Bush and Gorbachev, after lunch in the U.S. Ambassador's residence, 
that they had reached agreement on the Strategic Arms Limitations 
Talks (START), concluding nine years of negotiations to reduce 
their offensive arsenals. As a result, President Bush agreed to 
meet President Gorbachev in Moscow, on July 30 and 31.
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Afterwards, President Gorbachev participated in the "special 
session" of the Group of Seven that approved a program of 
assistance containing the following points: "special association" 
with the IMF and the World Bank, without lending rights; continuing 
cooperation from other international organizations, including the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; technical 
assistance on energy, defense conversion, food distribution, 
nuclear safety and transportation; greater access to foreign 
markets; visits by the Summit's host, British Prime Minister Major, 
as well as by next year's Summit Chairman, German Chancellor Kohl.
The result corresponds quite closely to the "step by step 
approach" outlined almost a month before by Secretary of State 
Baker, in a speech he gave at the Aspen Institute in Berlin. They 
reveal, according to President Gorbachev, that "we are living in 
one civilization." The result also indicates that "the skeptics"—  
Canada, Japan and the United States— prevailed over "the earnest" —  
France, Germany and Italy, which led the German press to portray 
the London Summit as a difficult moment for Chancellor Kohl.
However, these were not the only results of the Summit. The 
Group of Seven issued a "political communique" dealing with the 
Middle East; the United Nations; Yugoslavia and the Baltics; South 
Africa; and arms control.
Additionally, the Summit's "economic declaration" addressed 
the following issues:
- economic policy: shared objectives of sustained recovery and 
price stability, by means of the commitment to implement fiscal and 
monetary policies which provide the basis for lower real interest 
rates. Also, a pledge to improve economic efficiency through 
greater competition and transparency;
- international trade: the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round before the end of 1991, promising to "remain 
personally involved in this process;" ensuring that "regional 
integration is compatible with the multilateral trading system;" 
preference for mutually supportive trade and environmental 
policies; and an agreement to reduce the distortions caused by 
subsidized export credits and by tied aid;
- energy: to secure stable worldwide supplies and the 
encouragement of the commercial development of renewable energy 
sources; to support the European Community's initiative to 
establish a European Energy Charter, to promote free and 
undistorted energy trade;
- central and Eastern Europe: welcomed the spread of political 
and economic reform, as well as the mobilization by the G-24 of $31 
billion in bilateral support for these countries;
- Soviet Union: to support the movement towards political and 
economic transformation and readiness to assist its integration 
into the world economy;
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- the Middle East: welcomed the success of the Gulf Crisis 
Financial Coordination Group in mobilizing nearly $16 billion of 
assistance for those countries suffering the most direct economic 
impact of the Gulf Crisis.
- Developing countries and debt: Africa deserves special 
attention, especially the poorest; in the Asia-Pacific region, 
welcomed the efforts of many economies to assume new international 
responsibilities; in Latin America, "encouraged by the progress 
being made in carrying out genuine economic reforms and by 
developments in regional integration," welcomed "the continuing 
discussions on the Multilateral Investment Fund, under the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative which, together with other 
efforts, is helping to create the right climate for direct 
investment, freer trade and a reversal of capital flight;" finally, 
recognized the progress being made under the strengthened debt 
strategy."
- Environment: considered the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) "a landmark event;"
- Drugs: noted with satisfaction the progress made since the 
Houston Summit.
- Migration: expressed growing concern and the intention of 
returning to these issues at a future summit.
Thus, after all, the London Summit was not exclusively 
dedicated to a single issue.
I. 5. THE IMF'S SECOND WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK ( V E O )  
(WDW/29/91 - 16 OCTOBER 1991)
This year's advanced copy containing the excerpts of the 
second WEO was released to the press, by the staff of the IMF in 
Bangkok, Thailand, on October 10, just before the beginning of the 
annual Bank-Fund meetings, scheduled for October 12. As usual, the 
full text will be available by the end of October.
The advanced copy contains the following chapters: I) current 
developments and short-term prospects in the industrial and the 
developing countries; II) medium-term prospects and policy issues 
in the industrial countries, including baseline projections 
presented in a growth accounting framework; III) policy issues and 
medium-term projections for developing countries, including the 
implications of alternative assumptions about the external 
environment and domestic policies, as well as a discussion of the 
debt strategy; finally, five annexes are dedicated to the following 
topics: the collapse of trade among the former members of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; recent developments in the 
European Community; unemployment in the industrial countries; trade
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integration in the Western Hemisphere; and alternative measures of 
the debt burden of developing countries.
The rate of growth of the world economy, in 1991, is expected 
to be "a scant 1 percent," the lowest rate of the last nine years. 
In the industrial countries, output will decline from 2-1/2 percent 
in 1990 to 1-1/4 percent in 1991. As a result of the persistence of 
"cyclical divergences," the recession in Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the United States will be cushioned by the continued strong 
growth in Germany and Japan. In the developing countries as a 
group, in 1991, output is likely to decline by one half of a 
percent, due to the sharp contraction experienced by Eastern 
Europe— 12 percent of GDP— as well as in the Soviet Union, and the 
destruction caused by the war in the Middle East. In the Western. 
Hemisphere, economic activity "is expected to be sluggish in 1991, 
with a small rise in GDP reversing a decline of almost 1 percentage 
point last year."
By contrast, in 1992, "the world economy appears to be poised 
for a relatively moderate rebound, with output rising by 2-3/4 
percent and world trade growing by 5 percent." This "projected 
pickup" is based on "the expectation of a recovery from recession 
in North America and the United Kingdom...the recent decline in oil 
prices, and the end of the uncertainties associated with the 
conflict in the Middle East."
The medium term baseline projections rest on the following set 
of technical assumptions: unchanged policies; constant real
effective exchange rates among the major currencies; and a world 
oil price averaging $18.43 a barrel in 1991, rising to $18.61 a 
barrel in 1992 and remaining unchanged in real terms in subsequent 
years. On the basis of these assumptions, real GDP in the 
industrial countries is projected to recover from 1-1/2 percent in 
1991 to an average of 3 percent, while inflation would fall from 4- 
1/2 percent in 1991 to 3-1/4 percent between 1992-96. Assuming a 
combination of a broadly favorable external economic environment 
and the implementation of "sound economic policies," in the 
developing countries, output growth is projected to reach an annual 
average of about 4 percent between 1993-96, while inflation would 
decline from 40 percent in 1991-92 to 23 percent in 1993-96.
The WEO also analyzes the implications for both the world 
economy and the developing countries of the rising demand for world 
saving resulting from the reconstruction in the Middle East, German 
unification and reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
First, the impact on world interest rates and incomes "is unlikely 
to be large." Second, the "best policy response" in the industrial 
countries is to intensify fiscal consolidation, "thereby increasing 
the supply of world saving." Third, greater saving can be achieved 
through measures such as "mutual reductions in military 
expenditures," as well as by means of reductions in other spending 
categories, such as industrial and agricultural subsidies.
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Prospects for non-fuel commodity prices are not encouraging, 
due to "the slowdown in the expansion of the world economy, 
together with increasing production and stocks of agricultural 
commodities." These factors caused the fall of 8 percent in the 
average world price of non-fuel commodities in 1990, and will cause 
another decline in this average of 5-3/4 percent in 1991. Also 
contributing to this decline is the "increase in exports of metals 
and weak import demand for these commodities in the Soviet Union." 
By contrast, in 1992, the prices of almost all non-fuel commodities 
are expected to rebound by 3-1/4, as a result of the anticipated 
recovery of the world economy.
Finally, "failure to conclude" the Uruguay Round is 
characterized as "a major setback," because it "deprives the world 
of large welfare and efficiency gains." It is also a source of 
frustration for those developing countries and the "formerly 
centrally planned economies that have— with the encouragement of 
the Fund and the industrial countries— liberalized their trade 
systems unilaterally and pinned their hopes for growth and 
development on an outward-looking, market oriented strategy." Thus, 
the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round is seen as "the most 
important single contribution of the industrial countries to a 
favorable evolution of the world economy."
I. 6. THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
(WDW/34/91 - 20 NOVEMBER 1991)
If the presence of the Soviet delegation dominated the last 
Fund-Bank meetings, held in Bangkok in October (WDW/30/91), the 
reduction of military expenditures pervaded all the communiques 
issued by the key committees that preceded the annual meetings.
On October 12, the Finance Ministers and the Central Bank 
Governors of the Group of Seven (G-7), among the measures to 
strengthen global savings, "emphasized the need for all countries 
to curb unproductive expenditures." The next day, the Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors of the Group of Ten (G-10) were more 
specific, saying that to strengthen global savings "they stressed 
the importance of reducing unproductive expenditures, 
including excessive military expenditures, in all countries." Also, 
the Development Committee, on October 14, "agreed that the 
reduction in global and in many regional tensions should help 
developing countries to reduce excessive and unproductive arms 
expenditures." Finally, the same day, the Interim Committee came 
out strongly in favor of "reassessing spending on defense and 
subsidies." The only discordant note was contained in the 
communique of the Group of Twenty Four developing countries,
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cautioning "against the involvement of the IMF and the World Bank 
in issues beyond their economic and financial mandate."
The credit for proposing the incorporation of the reduction of 
arms expenditures in the agenda, corresponds to Michel Camdessus, 
Managing Director of the IMF, who was invited to continue for a 
second term.
First of all, on October 15, Camdessus made of this issue one 
of the three central priorities identified in his opening remarks 
to the Board of Governors of the Fund and the Bank. Under the 
heading of how to find "enough savings in the world to meet both 
past needs for financing and those now emerging," Camdessus said it 
was "unacceptable" that "the potential imbalance between projected 
savings and intended investment can only be resolved by a further 
increase in real interest rates." This could be "avoidable, 
provided all countries act soon to improve their saving 
performance, specially by cutting unproductive spending." These 
assertions only confirmed what the G-7 and the G-10, as well as the 
Interim and Development Committees had already asserted.
However, Camdessus went ahead to suggest how "all countries 
could redouble their efforts to cut unproductive spending." He 
identified two specific examples. First, "one of the most glaring 
and pernicious examples of unproductive spending— excessive 
protective subsidies." He estimated that "the abolition of 
agricultural support measures in the industrial countries would 
allow a reduction in budgetary outlays of more than $100 billion a 
year." Second, military spending is the other "area where 
substantial savings are now possible." Furthermore, given its 
"important economic and financial effects," defense spending is 
"directly relevant to the work of the IMF." He estimated that a 
reduction of 20 percent from the level of 1989 in military 
expenditures would generate budgetary savings of $90 billion or 
more a year. Considering "too high, in present circumstances" that 
average military spending in the world is around 4.5 percent, 
Camdessus suggested that "if the countries whose military spending 
is relatively high can reduce it to the world average, they will 
release some $140 billion for other uses." In other terms, "these 
two areas taken together, they amount to several times— I repeat 
several times— the additional need for savings to meet the new 
global challenges." Consequently, "the problem of global savings is 
not so much one of scarcity as one of misuse."
Also, in several press conferences held during the annual 
meetings, Camdessus was more specific. First, he saw "a very basic 
debate involving, for every country, its possible survival in a 
fight with enemies, but also its possible survival in the fight 
against poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment." Second, he made 
it very clear that "it is no longer the Managing Director who is 
speaking here," but "the entire membership." Finally, in his
closing press conference, Camdessus said that the objective is "to 
reallocate toward development purposes a part of the spending that, 
by definition, does not directly profit economic development and 
poverty alleviation." Clarifying that "we don't intend in the IMF 
to add to our new conditionality a new item of military 
conditionality," Camdessus concluded characterizing the reduction 
of military expenditure as "a good investment in a medium term 
perspective. "
Two weeks ago, the issue moved beyond these declarations, 
because Senator A. Cranston (D-CAL) presented a bill "to limit the 
provision of United States foreign assistance, including security 
assistance, to developing countries whose military expenditures do 
not exceed more than 3.6 percent of their gross national product." 
If approved, it will be known as the "Developing Countries 
Demilitarization Act of 1991." The figure of 3.6 percent of GNP 
corresponds to what the U.S. Secretary of Defense considers the 
adequate level of military spending for the United States in the 
post-Cold War. Also, the bill requires that "all U.S. 
representatives to multilateral lending and development assistance 
agencies and organizations" be instructed that "no United States 
funds" can be "provided as grants, loans, or collateral, directly 
or indirectly, through any multilateral agency or organization, to 
any developing country that expends more than 3.6 percent of its 
gross national product on military expenditures."
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II. THE U.S. ECONOMY
II. 1. THE ECONOMIC STATE OF THE UNION 
(WDW/6/91 - 20 FEBRUARY 1991)
This year's Economic Report of the President is the second 
submitted by President Bush. The message of transmission to 
Congress addresses the following issues: 1) toward renewed growth; 
2) supporting long-run growth; 3) flexibility and regulation; and
4) looking ahead.
President Bush begins offering an explanation of how "the 
longest peacetime economic expansion in U.S. history" came to a 
halt. He asserts that "the events of 1990 were a reminder that even 
a healthy economy can suffer shocks and short-term setbacks," with 
the immediate causes that gave the economy its final push into 
recession found in the oil price rise, caused by the events in the 
Persian Gulf, as well as the consequent plummeting of consumer 
confidence.
These shocks fell suddenly upon an economy that was "already 
growing slowly," particularly because of "worldwide increases in 
interest rates, tightened credit conditions, and the lingering 
effects of a successful attempt begun in 1988 by the Federal 
Reserve to prevent an acceleration of inflation."
This last remark was immediately interpreted as a criticism of 
the slowness by the Federal Reserve in lessening credit 
restrictions, even before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Nonetheless, 
the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 
Michael Boskin, refrained from any direct criticism of the Fed, 
saying that "probably with the benefit of hindsight, they might 
have been a bit too restrictive and perhaps should have eased a bit 
more sooner."
The present slowdown is described as a "temporary 
interruption," that "does not signal a decline in the basic long­
term vitality of the U.S. economy," because there were also 
"important economic achievements in 1990." First, the containment 
of inflation, with the GNP fixed-weighted price index remaining in 
1990 at the 4.5 percent level attained in 1989; second, the decline 
of the trade deficit, for the third consecutive year, to $77 
billion in 1990; and third, labor productivity measured by GNP per 
worker still was in Germany and Japan only three fourths of that of 
the United States.
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Looking ahead, the President states that "the current 
recession is expected to be mild and brief by historical 
standards," with economic growth "proj ected to recover by the 
middle of this year," while "inflation and interest rates are 
expected to decline."
This projection was immediately judged as a "rosy forecast," 
even when for 1991 real economic growth is projected to reach 0.9 
percent, slightly above the 0.3 percent of 1990.
Several reasons are given to expect that the present downturn 
will be "short and shallow." First, inventories are low relative to 
sales; second, net exports are expected to improve, on account of 
stronger growth among trading partners and the decline in the value 
of the dollar; third, oil prices remain a source of uncertainty, 
but their downward trend is expected to persist; finally, both 
fiscal and monetary policies are said to be "well positioned to 
mitigate the downturn," although "there is a downside risk that the 
tightness in credit markets evident in 1990 will continue into 
1991."
Looking at the prospects for renewing growth and to support it 
in the long run, the President points to the role of the recently 
adopted budgetary package, as well as to the tax system, 
emphasizing one of his most cherished and most controverted 
projects, the lowering of the capital gains tax. Additionally, "it 
is important that the Federal Reserve sustain money and credit 
growth necessary for the maintenance of sustained economic growth, 
especially during an economic downturn." Finally, banking reform 
"will help alleviate tight credit conditions," while a National 
Energy Strategy will strive at "removing unnecessary barriers to 
market forces so that ample supplies of reasonably priced energy 
can continue to foster economic growth."
In the long-run, among other measures, the President proposes 
raising the national saving rate and to lower the cost of capital, 
a sound national transportation infrastructure and excellence in 
education, as well as "to put power in the hands of individuals and 
families," and to increase the overall level of immigration, 
particularly of skilled workers.
The flexibility of the economy is attributed to "the reliance 
on free markets," indicating that the "lesson of the savings and 
loan crisis" is that it was caused by "poorly designed regulation, 
inadequate supervision, and limits on risk-reducing 
diversification." Also, economic growth and environmental 
protection are considered "compatible, but only if environmental 
goals reflect a careful cost-benefit analysis and if environmental 
regulation provides maximum flexibility to meet these goals at 
least cost."
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Finally, in the global economy, the United States "will 
continue to push aggressively for open markets in all nations... 
and will continue to oppose protectionism." For this purpose, the 
Uruguay Round is recognized as the "top trade policy priority," 
with the negotiations with Mexico and on the Enterprise for the 
Americas, "to pave the way toward a hemispheric zone of free 
trade," mentioned also as priorities.
The Report concludes asserting that the United States 
"continues to demonstrate by shining example that political 
democracy and free markets reinforce each other and together lead 
to liberty and prosperity."
II. 2. A UNIPOLAR WORLD? (WDW/11/91 - 27 MARCH 1991)
One of the best indicators of the swiftness of today's changes 
can be found in the high mortality rate recently exhibited by 
rationalizations, paradigms or theologies, about the present state 
of the international system.
Remember the "end of history" thesis? Not so long ago, Mr. 
Francis Fukuyama, Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy 
Planning Staff, held that we had reached "the end point of 
mankind's ideological evolution," because of "the emergence of 
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."
Remember the declinists? They were the followers of Yale 
Professor Paul Kennedy's thesis that since "the rise of the western 
world to the twenty first century," imperial powers have succumbed 
to "overstretch" and that the United States was no exception to 
this rule.
This propensity to "transform every success and every failure 
in foreign affairs into a policy doctrine" was recently baptized by 
Leslie Gelb, in The New York Times, as "policy monotheism," calling 
attention to an article by the well-known columnist Charles 
Krauthammer, that appears in the last issue of the prestigious 
quarterly Foreign Affairs.
Titled "The Unipolar Moment," Krauthammer's article challenges 
the commonly held assumption that the natural successor of the 
passing bipolar world is a multipolar structure, in which the 
United States would share power with Japan and Germany. Mr. 
Krauthammer holds that "the immediate post-Cold War world is not 
multipolar. It is unipolar," because "the center of world power is 




Mr. Krauthammer defends himself from the accusation of 
"triumphalism" recalling that the article was based in a lecture 
delivered in Washington D.C., on 18 September 1990. In his own 
terms, "the case for an interventionist America atop a unipolar 
world could be made last September," since it "was the direct 
result of the collapse of the Soviet empire." These events revealed 
"the true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world, 
brought sharply into focus by the gulf crisis: a single pole of 
world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the 
industrial West."
Those who believe Japan and Germany are capable of becoming 
"the great pillars of the new multipolar world," are victims of 
"materialist illusion," built upon "the notion that economic power 
inevitably translates into geopolitical influence." The crisis in 
the Persian Gulf has "inadvertently revealed the unipolar structure 
of today's world."
Furthermore, admitting that "multipolarity will come in time," 
Mr. Krauthammer asserts that "the unipolar moment" could well last 
"perhaps another generation." The question is if another "major 
element of the post-Cold War reality," in the form of "the revival 
of American isolationism," will succeed in challenging "the vision 
of a unipolar world led by a dynamic America."
This resurgence of isolationism is found by Mr. Krauthammer in 
what he terms "the usual pockets of post-Vietnam liberal 
isolationism." However, he considers more worrisome those 
isolationist impulses found in the positions adopted recently by 
well known "realists," such as Georgetown University Professor 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, suggesting that the United States should become 
"a normal country in a normal time."
Mr. Krauthammer argues that "international stability is never 
a given," because "the world does not sort itself out on its own." 
Consequently, "if America wants stability, it will have to create 
it," by means of practicing a foreign policy of "robust and 
difficult interventionism."
This was viewed by Mr. Gelb, in The New York Times, as the 
elevation of an event into a new "theology," or as only another 
chapter in the "short and tumultuous history of taking largely 
unique events — the fall of Eastern Europe and China to Communism, 
the Korean War, the Cuban missile crisis and Vietnam—  and 
elevating their purported lessons into policy dogmas, be they 
Truman Doctrines, Kennedy Corollaries or Vietnam Syndromes." Thus, 
concludes Mr. Gelb, "once again, the nation seems poised to bury 
what the ascendant high priests call the Vietnam Syndrome in order 
to establish yet another new world order."
20
The response came in Mr. Krauthammer's column in The 
Washington Post, titled "Bless Our Pax Americana," saying that "the 
end of the Cold War changed the structure of the world. The gulf 
war simply revealed it. Even the most obdurate deniers of 
unipolarity can no longer deny it." Mr. Krauthammer recalls that 
"before the gulf, Germany and Japan were being touted as the new 
superpowers, the pillars of the new multipolar world. One hears 
little of that nonsense now."
To conclude, since "it is hardly news to say that we are 
living in a unipolar world," Mr. Krauthammer asks "what are Gelb 
and his policy polytheists objecting to?" The response is that 
since the world "has entered a period of Pax Americana...Americans 
should like it— and exploit it."
The problem with these propositions, for Mr. Gelb, is that 
they "lead down the path to new dogma, to the single answer of the 
U.S. becoming the world's policeman under the umbrella of 
collective security."
II. 3. THE ISOLATIONIST IMPULSE (WDW/22/91 - 31 JULY 1991)
In opposition to those that have announced the recent 
emergence of a unipolar world (WDW/11/91), the debate about the 
nature of the post-Cold War international system has been joined by 
representatives of the oldest paradigm of U.S. foreign policy— the 
isolationist advise against "foreign entanglements."
For Charles Krauthammer, author of an article on "the lonely 
superpower" in the last issue of The New Republic, two major 
factions already exist within the ranks of today's neoisolationism. 
On the right, there are those that fear the corrupting influence of 
the world and demand that "America should return home." On the 
left, those conscious of the Vietnam legacy fear that U. S. 
activism will corrupt the world. Krauthammer characterizes the 
proponents of both strains as "endlessly resourceful in trying to 
escape the responsibilities that history placed on their 
shoulders."
Recently, the isolationist camp saw its ranks strengthened by 
the presence of two formidable exponents. One is William Hyland, 
the editor of the prestigious quarterly Foreign Affairs and the 
other is Alan Tonelson, until very recently the associate editor of 
the equally prestigious quarterly Foreign Policy. Hyland's proposal 
was presented in an op-ed published in The New York Times, titled 
"downgrade foreign policy." Tonelson's took the form of a more 
lengthy essay that appeared in The Atlantic Monthly.
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For Hyland, the United States "has never been less threatened 
by foreign forces than it is today. But the unfortunate corollary 
is that never since the Great Depression has the threat to domestic 
well-being been greater." To have won the Cold War means that, for 
the United States, there is "about a decade of freedom ... to 
concentrate our resources, energy and attention on dealing with the 
domestic crisis." To implement this introspective turn, Hyland 
proposes the following four point program: 1) to start selectively 
disengaging abroad; 2) to avoid new entanglements; 3) to withdraw 
the bulk of the U.S. armed forces from overseas; and 4) to cut back 
drastically on foreign aid.
Tonelsonfs more lengthy contribution is more radical. To 
replace the globalism or the internationalism practiced by the 
foreign policy of the United States since the end of the Second 
World War, Tonelson proposes a foreign policy inspired by 
"interest-based thinking," under the following assumptions: l)
"accept today's anarchic system of competing nation-states as a 
given," concentrate on specific objectives; 2) "since the world 
lacks a commonly accepted referee," rely only on your own 
resources; 3) since "resources are always relatively scarce," the 
benefits sought should be aligned with the costs affordable and the 
means available.
On the basis of these assumptions, Tonelson proposes the 
following measures to implement an "interest-based" foreign policy: 
1) rule out initiatives that siphon more wealth out than what they 
bring in; 2) avoid measures that only destroy wealth, such as 
military spending or inflation; 3) pursue self-reliance, instead of 
world efficiency; 4) rely on strength rather than on norms and 
institutions; 5) recognize that economic power has intrinsic 
strategic value 6) subordinate foreign policy to domestic concerns;
7) admit that modest policy means cannot build a congenial world 
order; 8) global change cannot be controlled or manipulated by a 
state's day-to-day foreign policy; 9) seek ideals, if enough 
revenues can be raised to pursue them; finally 10) shy away from 
any overarching strategy or conceptual approach.
"In a perilous strategic world, concludes Tonelson, it is 
usually a mistake to consider foreign policy to be an activist 
instrument at all." Conseguently, foreign policy should avoid 
problems, reduce vulnerabilities and costs, maximize options, buy 
time and muddle through. Admittedly, these objectives "may be 
uninspiring" but they are "well suited to a strong, wealthy, 
geographically isolated country."
In the relations with the Soviet Union there would not be an 
overarching policy and the goals would be "predominantly negative." 
In the relations with friends and allies, Tonelson proposes two 
objectives. First, "to decouple America's security from that of its 
allies" and second, to "maintain access to European and East Asian
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markets not by wielding military and political clout but by the 
much more reliable strategy of insisting on complete reciprocity in 
trade and investment and restoring our leadership in a wide range 
of major industries."
Finally, in the developing world Tonelson suggests it is "time 
to disengage." However, "on the security side, the United States 
needs to worry about only one region: the Caribbean Basin." Two 
basic concerns are recognized in this region: "that no hostile 
outside force establish any significant military or intelligence 
presence, and that Mexico not fall apart economically and 
socially."
In these terms, the isolationist impulse as a source of 
inspiration of U.S. foreign policy seems to be quite vigorous. 
Still more relevant is that most of the presidential hopefuls from 
the Democratic Party seem to favor placing domestic concerns above 
foreign policy priorities.
II. 4. THE SLIP OF SALOMON BROTHERS
(WDW/24/91 - 11 SEPTEMBER 1991)
A principal player has violated the rules that prevail in the 
market for U.S. government securities, characterized by Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance, Jerome H. Powell, 
as "the largest, most liquid, and most important financial market 
in the world." As the instrument through which the United States 
finances its national debt, the bond market is, consequently, "the 
bedrock of the world financial system." After all, this market 
handles daily more than $120 billion of marketable government 
securities, exceeding $1.3 trillion in 1990, up from $600 million 
in 1981.
At the height of the summer, on Friday, August 9, Salomon 
Brothers admitted that it had improperly exceeded the authorized 
limit in several auctions to purchase government securities, by 
submitting false bids in the name of customers without their 
authorization. On Wednesday, August 14, Salomon Brothers disclosed 
that the firm's three top executive officers— John Gutfreund, 
chairman and chief executive, Thomas W. Strauss, president, and 
John W. Meriwether, vice-chairman— knew about some of these illegal 
bids. On Sunday, August 18, amidst the news of the coup in the 
Soviet Union, Warren E. Buffet replaced John Gutfreund, who 
resigned as the firm's chairman and chief executive. Thus, 
unravelled this major scandal that erupted in the very exclusive 
world of U.S. Treasury's securities auctions.
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The U.S. securities market is the instrument used by the 
Federal Reserve Board to administer the money supply that 
decisively influences domestic and international interest rates. 
Most of the operations are carried out by an "exclusive club" of 39 
commercial and investment banks, designated by the Open Market Desk 
of the Federal Reserve System, through the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. The number of these primary dealers has changed over 
time. Originally, in 1960, there were 18 and presently 16 of the 39 
are foreign corporations.
Treasury securities are sold in periodic auctions, organized 
according to a "regular and predictable schedule," amounting to 
"about 157 separate securities auctions each year." There are 
strict limits on the amount of securities that can be awarded to a 
single bidder in these auctions. According to Assistant Secretary 
Powell, the purpose of these limits is "to ensure broad 
distribution of Treasury securities and to make it less likely that 
ownership of Treasury securities become concentrated in a few hands 
as a result of the auction."
This maximum award limitation was originally set 29 years ago, 
at 25 percent of the total offering, and it has undergone several 
modifications. Presently, any single bidder cannot be awarded more 
than 35 percent of any public offering of Treasury securities.
This last limitation was precisely the rule violated by 
Salomon Brothers. As revealed in a 52 page report to Congress, 
Salomon's new chairman, Warren Buffett, admitted that in the 
auction held on May 22, 1991, Salomon controlled 94 percent of the 
$12.25 billion in two-year notes offered. As described by The Wall 
Street Journal, in what almost sounds as an understatement, "this 
overwhelming control of the May two-year auction enabled Salomon to 
corner a good portion of the market."
Furthermore, this was only one of several instances in which 
Salomon deliberately crossed the authorized limit, far beyond the 
35 percent authorized. To make matters even worse, it took 
Salomon's chief executives more than four months before they 
admitted that they knew about such irregularities.
Up to now, there have been at least three different reactions 
to these astonishing revelations. First, the new Salomon manager, 
with a lot of what The Wall Street Journal called "Nebraska charm," 
prescribed "tough rules, tough cops and tough prosecutors." The 
reason is that since "huge markets attract people who measure 
themselves by money. Sooner or later they're going to get 
themselves in trouble."
This coincides with the position adopted by several members of 
Congress, who expressed "impatience" with present regulations, as 
Representative Ed Markey (D-Mass.) who declared that "the rules
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that are on the books are clearly unacceptable." More graphically, 
Representative Jim Slattery (D-Kan.) said Salomon executives 
deserved "nothing but a swift kick in the butt."
The Washington Post. in an editorial on "Rigging the Bond 
Market," probably said it best: "it's pretty clear that this
country's recent infatuation with financial deregulation is dead. 
The dewey-eyed idea that financial markets are self-regulating, or 
that the trading-firms are self-policing, or that regulation is 
merely an outmoded and unneeded burden on business efficiency are 
revealed by many unhappy experiences of the recent past— but none 
more than this one— to be a dangerous fantasy."
The regulators, such as the Treasury Department, the Federal 
Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), urged 
caution. Assistant Secretary Powell declared, until a thorough 
investigation is "reasonably complete, we would prefer to withhold 
judgment as to the adequacy of existing laws and regulations, as 
well as existing enforcement capabilities and practices."
Finally, there is the reaction of those, like the Nobel Prize- 
winning economist Milton Friedman, who blame the system of primary 
dealers for encouraging collusion and domination of the market by 
what he calls "a cabal." Consequently, what is prescribed is a less 
secretive and less restrictive system of auctions.
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III. THE SOVIET UNION
III. 1. WHITER THE SOVIET UNION? (WDW/3/91 - 30 JANUARY 1991)
It is a sign of the tines that the heads of the seven major 
industrialized economies, at the Houston Economic Summit of July 
1990, requested from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
convene the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) for undertaking, in close consultation with the 
Commission of the European Communities (EC), "a detailed study of 
the Soviet economy, make recommendations for its reform, and 
establish the criteria under which Western economic assistance 
could effectively support such reforms.”
It is also a sign of the times that these four organizations 
visited the Soviet Union, before the end of last year, where they 
"were received with much courtesy and helpfulness," as well as that 
the summary and recommendations of their study, delivered on 
deadline, were made available to the public, on December 21 1990.
The title of the study released is The Economy of the USSR: 
Summary and Recommendations and it includes the following sections:
1) the current state of the economy of the USSR; 2) the present 
course of reform; 3) alternative approaches to reform; 4) main 
elements of a recommended strategy; and 5) criteria for, and forms 
of, external assistance.
On the state of the Soviet economy, the study reveals that the 
deceleration that started at least since the early seventies, "has 
recently turned into a fall in output and employment, accompanied 
by evident and growing imbalances."
The economic results of 1990, released recently in Moscow, 
amply confirm this diagnosis. According to a Tass report, in the 
Soviet Union in 1990 GNP fell by 2%, national gross income dropped 
by 4% and productivity contracted by 3%. Also, foreign trade was 
estimated to have fallen by 6.9% and the ruble overhang, feeding 
greater inflation as a result of increases in income amidst the 
generalized fall in production, reached 132.7 billion in 1990 from 
104.7 billion in 1989.
The present state of the Soviet economy is characterized as 
one in which "the old planning system has broken down but has not
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been dismantled; meanwhile, the structures vital to the functioning 
of a market have yet to be put in place."
This poses the issue of sequencing, or the alternative between 
radical vs. gradual reform. Declaring themselves ignorant of the 
existence of a gradual path to reform, the institutions recognize 
"two broad alternative approaches to sequencing...a conservative 
approach, and a more radical approach," which they recommend. In 
the terms of MIT Professor P. Dornbusch, "radical change is the 
only realistic option," in the Soviet Union.
Thus, the international organizations propose to tackle 
simultaneously the need for stabilization and structural reform. 
The process of stabilization fundamentally entails "a very sharp 
reduction in the deficit of the general government — from its 1990 
level of some 8 percent of GDP; the absorption of excess money 
holdings; a strong hold on credit creation; and movement towards 
positive real interest rates." Furthermore, recognizing that this 
might entail some unwanted disruption, the institutions recommend 
that "in the short run this should be supported by an incomes 
policy which would set both a floor for social reasons and a 
ceiling on the growth of incomes."
Nonetheless, "financial stabilization by itself does nothing 
to establish a market," or to address the issue of structural 
reform. For this last purpose, it is necessary to implement the 
following measures: 1) rapid and comprehensive price
liberalization, as the appropriate response to shortages; 2) 
progress toward trade liberalization, with the continuation in the 
near term of subsidies of rents and the prices of a few essential 
consumer goods; 3) a broadening of the parallel market for foreign 
exchange, with the unification of the exchange market for current 
account transactions within a year; 4) the establishment of private 
ownership rights and the elimination of controls that prevent 
competition and discourage efficiency; finally, 5) since "the 
necessary economic reform program cannot be implemented without an 
initial decline in output and employment...it is therefore 
essential that a safety net be in place at the start of the 
program."
As for the role of foreign assistance, the international 
institutions recommend that technical and humanitarian assistance 
be provided, while "general balance of payments assistance or 
project assistance" will be useful only "when a comprehensive 
program of systemic reforms has begun to be implemented, leading to 
a closer integration of the economy of the USSR into the world 
economy."
The report served as background for the decision, announced on 
December 12 by the United States, to propose that the status of 
"special associate" be granted to the Soviet Union at the IMF and
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the World Bank, "to advance the process of economic reform and 
liberalization."
However, recent events in the Baltics have put everything on 
hold. As declared by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Norman Lamont, at the conclusion of the last Group of Seven (G-7) 
meeting in New York, on January 20-21, "any question of any 
relationship with the IMF would have to be considered very 
cautiously and is not on the agenda at the moment."
III. 2. THE TRIUMPH OF MONOECONOMICS (WDW/18/91 - 3 JULY 1991)
Ten years ago, Albert Hirschman in his classic "The Rise and 
Decline of Development Economics" foresaw the demise of the claim 
that a separate kind of economic analysis, known as the 
subdiscipline of development economics, was required to deal with 
the special case of the developing countries. As anticipated, the 
eighties witnessed the almost unchallenged application throughout 
the developing countries of the set of "simple, yet 'powerful* 
theorems" of traditional economic analysis, proving in Hirschman's 
terms that, as with physics, "there is only one economics."
In practice, this aspiration to universality of "orthodox 
economics" remained far from its mark while at least one third of 
humanity was living under an alternative economic system. However, 
several recent events indicate that what was known as "orthodox 
economics" now furnishes the principles on which are based the 
policy guidelines observed in almost all the economies of the 
world.
This rapid succession of events started with the news, floated 
by British sources, that consultations were in progress on the 
decision to invite President Gorbachev to the London Summit of 
seven industrialized countries. Then came the decision, adopted by 
the Finance Ministers and central bankers of the G-Seven, to offer 
the Soviet Union "associate member status" in the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Finally, last week, the Council on Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), the process of economic integration among what 
were known as the "socialist economies", closed its doors.
President Gorbachev's participation in the G-Seven was linked 
to the presentation of a request for massive financial assistance 
to support the process of transition of the Soviet Union towards a 
market economy.
Highly controversial, the proposal was baptized "a grand 
bargain" of "dollars for democracy" and it was prepared by Soviet
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economist Grigory Yavlinski, with the technical assistance of a 
group of Harvard University experts in transitions from socialism. 
In the terms of one of these best known experts, Professor Jeffrey 
Sachs, the estimated cost of the package would be between $30 to 
$50 billion a year over a period of five years.
Reactions to the proposal came from several quarters. For 
instance, the well-known Soviet advisor G. Arbatov dismissed it as 
a sell-out of "socialist soul." Also, expressing the reaction 
caused in some of the industrialized countries, instead of the much 
publicized "grand bargain," Secretary Baker proposed a "step by 
step" approach, to be applied "as the Soviets demonstrate the will 
to help themselves."
Among the elements of the gradual approach appear the 
abolition of impediments to private investment in energy
development and an effort to improve the food distribution system 
through market incentives. Also, the package includes the 
conversion of Soviet defense industries to the production of 
consumer goods and it offers technical advice to promote education 
in market principles and practices, as well as more open trading 
relationships.
As part of the "step by step" approach, it was announced that 
Mr. Gorbachev would be received by the G-Seven, on July 17, after 
the conclusion of the London Summit and that he would be offered 
"associate member status" in the IMF and the World Bank. The 
meaning of such status remains vague, since it has never existed 
before, its purpose apparently is to give access to technical 
assistance, though not immediately to financial resources. In the 
terms of U.S. Treasury Secretary Brady, after the London meeting of 
Ministers of Finance and central bankers of the G-Seven, "large 
sums of money are not what we are talking about here."
Finally, last Friday in Budapest, the member governments 
decided to shut down the doors of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA). The closing ceremony was only a formality, given 
the previous collapse in trade relations that resulted from the 
profound changes recently experienced in some of the member
countries— Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia,
Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam.
Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam favored the creation of a successor 
institution, an Organization for Economic Cooperation. 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland countered with the proposal to 
create an organization for European members only, to examine how to 
end the collapse in trade and how to move ahead, toward a market 
economy. In the end, only a committee was designated to determine, 
during the next 90 days, how to liquidate the assets owned jointly 
by the member countries.
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In the immediate future, it can be expected that this trend 
towards the universalization of monoeconomics will be intensified, 
leading to the application of a single set of universally valid 
principles, throughout the rest of the world economic system. This 
does not mean that the present system will lack diversity. 
Preachers of uniformity should be reminded that there cannot be 
found two capitalist systems that are exactly alike. Neither should 
attention be paid to those that see, in this universalization of 
capitalism, the beginning of an age of perpetual harmony. Those who 
harbor such illusions should be reminded that the major capitalist 
powers were among the main rivals that confronted each other in the 
two great conflagrations experienced in this century.
III. 3. THE GRAND BARGAIN (WDW/20/91 - 17 JULY 1991)
Today, President Gorbachev "travels to Canosa," as The New 
York Times said, "hat in hand...to win some relief for his nation's 
rheumatic economy."
Preceded by a succession of fascinating maneuvers to get 
himself invited to the London Summit of the seven industrialized 
economies, the Soviet leader has proven, once again, that he has 
the capacity to startle and to gain the world's attention.
At the center of this gambit is the "Grand Bargain" of 
"dollars for democracy," drafted by the Joint Working Group on 
Western Cooperation in the Soviet Transformation to Democracy and 
the Market Economy. This group was cochaired by Soviet economist 
Grigory Yavlinsky, former deputy prime minister of the Russian 
republic and author of the previously rejected "500 days" crash 
program and by Professor Graham Allison, former dean of Harvard's 
Kennedy School of Government, home of one of the most prestigious 
teams of "experts on revamping socialist economies." Among the 
better known members of the team appears none other than Harvard 
Professor Jeffrey Sachs, also known as the "architect of the shock 
therapy" applied to Poland, as well as MIT Professor Stanley 
Fischer, former chief economist of the World Bank.
Also impressive has been the quite effective public relations 
blitz that started with the reproduction of excerpts in The 
Financial Times and by an editorial endorsement by The New York 
Times. in advance of the proposal's formal presentation, held in 
Cambridge, Mass. on June 14 in front of reporters from all over the 
world.
The excitement peaked when it was learned that, during the 
following weekend, President Gorbachev had met privately with Mr.
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Yavlinsky, at the Kremlin for one hour, in what was described by 
"one source close to Mr. Yavlinsky" as "a wonderful meeting." Also, 
on Sunday June 16, the arrival of Professor Allison in Moscow, 
unleashed speculation that this was "proof that the plan was being 
reviewed at the highest level."
The proposed program places the Soviet economy at a critical 
juncture, characterized as reform or chaos, holding that the Soviet 
system cannot be reformed, "it must be replaced." For this purpose, 
the program is built on what are characterized as the six pillars 
of a market economy; private property; macroeconomic stabilization; 
price liberalization; privatization of state enterprises; openness 
to international market forces; and limitation of state 
intervention.
In money terms, the program requires at least $30 billion a 
year, during five years. The justification for spending this 
amount, according to Professor Sachs, is that "if you don't like 
what is happening in Yugoslavia, you really won't like what will 
happen in the Soviet Union." Because "the presence of 30,000 
nuclear warheads in the Soviet Union make instability in that 
country even more dangerous." If that would be the cost of creating 
"a stable, democratic Soviet Union," commented Morton Kondracke in 
The Wall Street Journal, "that would be a grand bargain, indeed."
This initial enthusiasm was quickly tempered by some 
formidable skeptics. For instance, Secretary of State Baker 
countered with a "step by step approach," comprising associate 
membership in the IMF and the World Bank, as well as oil 
exploration and food distribution, the conversion of military 
industries, education in market principles and trade benefits. 
Also, at the conclusion of the summit preparatory meeting of 
ministers of finance and central bankers from the G-Seven, 
Secretary Brady emphasized that there had been no discussion about 
large sums of money.
Other reactions can be briefly summarized. For instance, Henry 
Kissinger cautioned that "the United States is in danger of finding 
itself propelled by well-meaning enthusiasts" and reminded that the 
United States is "a country with interests and not a foundation 
with charitable objectives."
Other reactions were even more poignant. For instance, one 
said Soviet democracy was "cheap at $100 billion;" while another 
saw the Grand Bargain as a "big rip-off." Zbigniew Brzezinski asked 
for "help for the new Rüssian revolution" and The New York Times 
editorialized that the time had come for "disarming the Soviets, 
with aid."
As the skepticism mounted in some industrialized countries, 
Moscow's preliminary enthusiasm was also being tempered by a sense
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of realism. In the terms of Yevgeny Primakov, one of Mr. 
Gorbachev's closest advisers, "there will be no manna from heaven." 
Additionally, the Kremlin said that it was looking for investments 
at the London Summit, not for cash. At a press conference, 
President Gorbachev declared "some of you may think that Gorbachev 
is going to crawl on his knees and plead for assistance...this is 
just not serious." Finally, a 23 page letter sent by President 
Gorbachev to the G-Seven leaders contained "no surprises." As Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada declared, upon his arrival in 
London, "I don't think you will see either miracles or blank 
checks."
As the possibility of a "grand bargain" vanished, "the world's 
greatest political acrobat," as R. Lawrence called the Soviet 
President in The Journal of Commerce, should be credited, at least, 
with an amazing capacity to attract the limelight.
III. 4. THE SOVIET UNION JOINS THE IMF 
(WDW/30/91 23 - OCTOBER 1991)
It is a sign of the times that the economic difficulties of 
the Soviet Union were the dominant issue during the last annual 
meetings of the Bretton Woods institutions, held in Bangkok, 
Thailand, from 12 to 17 October.
As described by Paul Blustein, in The Washington Post, this 
was illustrated by the virtual anonymity of Mr. Angel Gurria, 
Mexico's chief debt negotiator, who for many years had the dubious 
honor of occupying the center stage in these meetings. This time, 
"the Soviet Union's economic crisis overshadowed all else, and the 
limelight shone almost exclusively on Grigory Yavlinsky, the 
passionate, radical economist heading the Soviet delegation," 
Blustein reported from Bangkok.
The historical significance of Soviet participation in these 
meetings was highlighted by the Managing Director of the IMF, when 
he said that for the Bretton Woods institutions, "a long-awaited 
opportunity...to become truly universal... is drawing close."
Moreover, this recently achieved universality was poignantly 
illustrated by a press release informing that on October 15, 
Albania became the 156th. member of the IMF. For the time being, by 
contrast, the Soviet Union only achieved the status of "special 
association," by means of an agreement signed in Moscow between 
Managing Director Camdessus and President Gorbachev.
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This "special association" constitutes also a historical 
first. It used to be that, at the IMF, no half-way houses were 
permitted in matters of membership.
The agreement, made public on October 5 simultaneously in 
Washington and Bangkok, specifies the terms and conditions for the 
two signatories. The Fund will "conduct reviews of the economy and 
economic policies of the U.S.S.R., similar to the consultations 
conducted by the Fund with its members.” It will also provide 
technical assistance "in the areas of macroeconomic policies and 
financial programming, exchange and payments, fiscal, monetary, 
banking and related issues, and in statistics," as well as training 
courses and it will "make available to the U.S.S.R. documents 
directly related to the functioning of the Special Association." 
The U.S.S.R. will be invited to participate in the Fund's Executive 
Board meetings to discuss issues covered in the agreement, as well 
as to the annual meetings of the Fund, which led to the presence of 
Mr. Yavlinsky in Bangkok. Finally, in a carefully drafted 
paragraph, it is said that "the Fund shall give favorable 
consideration to requests from the Union Republics...under terms 
and conditions to be agreed between the Fund and the relevant Union 
Republic." However, it is added that "the Fund shall inform the 
U.S.S.R. of any request by a Union Republic."
For its part, the Soviet Union will be expected to provide 
information, "as is required from members of the Fund," that will 
be made available through Fund publications. Also, the Fund will 
open and operate a "resident office" in the Soviet Union, that will 
enjoy "a status and privileges and immunities at least as favorable 
as those conferred by the U.S.S.R. upon the resident office on any 
other international financial organization." It is specified that 
the Soviet Union will contribute to "the costs incurred by the Fund 
under the Special Association" in an amount that will be 
"determined by agreement" between both. Finally, the "special 
association" can be terminated by the admission of the Soviet Union 
to full membership in the Fund, as well as by unilateral
declaration, submitted three months in advance by one of the 
parties.
There were other issues at the Bangkok meetings, although none 
received as much attention. For instance, the Interim Committee of 
the Board of Governors of the IMF "observed that the pronounced
slowdown of world economic growth this year was expected to be
followed in 1992 by a moderate recovery." Also, the Interim
Committee expressed concern for the delays in the Uruguay Round and 
supported the international debt strategy.
The Development Committee agreed that the reduction of poverty 
and the promotion of sustainable economic growth should be the top 
priorities for the World Bank and the Fund in the nineties, while 
the Group of 24 developing countries asserted that these goals
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cannot be reached without "substantial external resources" to 
support economic adjustment programs.
Another issue that surfaced during the meetings, generating 
some anxieties, was the reduction of arms expenditures as one of 
the lending criteria of both the World Bank and the Fund. The new 
President of the World Bank, Lewis Preston, at a press conference, 
stated that loans may be withheld from countries that spend too 
much in armaments. Also, the Managing Director of the IMF said that 
although this was not a "new item of military conditionality," the 
Fund and the Bank "have to be very outspoken in pressing this 
point. We want to put our experience and knowledge at the disposal 
of our members in proceeding effectively in the reallocation of 
resources." An immediate reaction was contained in the communique 
of the G-24, cautioning "against the involvement of the Fund and 
the Bank in issues beyond their strict economic and financial 
mandate."
To summarize the results, in Hirschman's terms, the Bangkok 
meetings may be known as those where "the triumph of monoeconomics" 
(WDW/18/91) became institutionalized, through the universalization 
of the IMF and the World Bank.
IV. THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
IV. 1. THE OUTLOOK FOR NON-FUEL COMMODITIES 
(WDW/2/91 - 23 JANUARY 1991)
During the second half of the eighties, the prices of non-fuel 
commodities experienced one of their characteristic "roller­
coaster" rides. In 1986, real commodity prices registered their 
lowest level since the depression of the thirties. The World Bank's 
aggregate index for non-fuel commodities (1979-81=100) remained at 
the same level of 80.5 between 1985 and the second half of 1987, 
when the current dollar index began increasing after the record low 
of 74.4 it registered in the first quarter of 1987. A broad-based 
rally from these record lows followed, between 1986 and 1989, 
increasing the current dollar index of non-fuel commodities by 19%. 
Even so, primary commodity prices barely kept up with the increases 
in the value of manufactured exports. The World Bank's non-fuel 
commodity price index increased only by 1.3% over the 1986-89 
period, after it was deflated by the Manufactured Unit Value (MUV) 
index.
In 1990, this upward trend came to an end, since in aggregate 
nominal terms the prices of non-fuel primary commodity prices 
declined by 6.8%. Thus, since the MUV index in 1990 was estimated 
to increase by 6.3%, the non-fuel commodity index measured in 
constant dollars fell 12.3%.
The short term prospects are not encouraging. Non-fuel 
commodity prices in 1991 are forecast to remain unchanged, while 
the MUV index is expected to increase by 9%, which amounts in real 
terms to a decline of 8.3%. By contrast, in 1992, an increase of 
3.3% in the prices of non-fuel commodities in aggregate nominal 
terms will make the constant dollar index turn upwards, by 2.1%.
Major uncertainties appear in the short-run. If crude oil 
prices remain for a long period above $20 per barrel, "most other 
primary commodity prices, especially industrial raw materials, 
could be expected to fall as a result of the impact of high energy 
prices and lowered GNP growth on demand for investment and consumer 
goods."
These are some of the short-term projections presented by the 
World Bank in the recently released, two-volume, study on the Price 
Prospects for Maior Primary Commodities.
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In the long-run, assuming steady increases in world economic 
growth, over the 1993-2000 period, the non-fuel index for 33 
commodities is expected to increase by 11.7% in constant dollar 
terms. However, over the 2000-2005 period, non-fuel commodity 
prices once again are expected to decline in real terms.
Several assumptions about the performance of the world economy 
underlie these long term forecasts, particularly concerning the 
evolution of certain trends that emerged in the eighties. First, 
growing integration of the world economy through trade will 
continue, as evidenced by the steady increase in the ratio of trade 
to GDP in the major economies. Second, the Hastonishing" expansion 
of financial markets will continue outfacing the growth of 
international trade. Third, the direction and composition of 
international financial flows will continue, with Japan remaining 
the largest supplier of international capital. Fourth, the 
continuation of the steady decline in the share of raw materials in 
international trade. Finally, the persistence of the trend towards 
the concentration of trade flows within three major trading blocs - 
-North America, Western Europe and the Western Pacific.
On the basis of these assumptions, the industrial countries 
are expected to perform "markedly better" in the nineties. Real GDP 
growth is expected to average 3% over the 1990-2005 period, with 
per capita real income in these countries expected to rise at a 
yearly average of 2.6%, by contrast with the 2.3% experienced 
during the eighties. The average rate of inflation in these 
countries is expected to remain fairly low, between 3% and 4% 
yearly.
By contrast, the prospects for the low and middle income 
countries in the nineties "are less clear and mixed," since average 
per capita real income is projected to rise at a yearly rate of 3%, 
based on a rate of growth of 5% in GDP. But this average hides 
considerable differences among different groups of countries.
For the severely indebted middle-income countries the average 
annual growth rate of per capita income is expected to increase by 
2% in the nineties, from a yearly average of -0.5% in the eighties. 
However, this projection is based on what is termed "the optimistic 
assumption of a gradual decline in the ratio of debt service to 
exports and a resumption of net financial transfers."
These projections of economic activity and world price levels 
indicate that demand for major primary commodities will continue 
"to shift markedly." First, growth in the demand for primary 
commodities in the industrialized countries is likely to 
decelerate, while in the developing countries it will accelerate, 
particularly in East and South Asia, as well as in Eastern Europe. 
Second, several factors indicate that the commodity composition of 
demand will also shift over the 1990-2005 period. Changes in
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industrial efficiency and innovations will increase the demand for 
"exotic raw and semi-processed materials, at the expense of basic 
commodities." Also, environmental concerns will generate demand for 
"cleaner materials and fuels, while the industrialization of low 
and middle-income countries will demand standard industrial raw 
materials and consumer staples."
IV. 2. THE EXTERNAL DEBT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(WDW/5/91 - 13 FEBRUARY 1991)
Remember the debt crisis? This year's World Debt Tables, 
issued in two volumes by the World Bank at the end of last year, 
admit that it is now "somewhat less severe than two years ago," 
although it is "far from over."
Several factors have contributed to an improvement in debt 
indicators, such as the application of the Brady Initiative, the 
easing of terms on Paris Club rescheduling, the continuation of 
other programs of debt relief and rescheduling and the strong 
export performance of some indebted countries. By contrast, the 
persistence of the crisis manifests itself in the failure of some 
debtor countries to adjust, in the substantial increase in arrears 
and in the heavy burden of official debt and debt service in some 
countries, with the limited availability of external finance
"underlying many of these problems."
This year's Tables contain several new features: first, 
aggregate net flows and net transfers to each country; second, a 
reconciliation of stock and flow data; third, expected 
disbursements from the stock of undisbursed debt for the next ten 
years; fourth, separate treatment of East European debt and capital 
flows; and fifth, a further breakdown of the private creditor
group, with bonds shown separately.
Some of the highlights contained in the first volume of 
Analysis and Summary Tables are:
1) At the end of 1990, the total external debt of developing 
countries was expected to reach $1,341 billion, more than 6 percent 
above the $1,261 billion it reached in 1989.
2) Total external debt owed by Latin America and the Caribbean 
in 1990 is estimated to have reached $428.6 billion, from $422.1 
billion in 1989, or almost 47.9 percent of GNP and 261 percent of 
total exports of goods and services.
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3) The composition of developing-country debt "has changed 
dramatically," with official debt, including the use of IMF credit, 
accounting for 46 percent in 1990, compared with 32 percent in 
1984. By contrast, long-term debt from private sources is expected 
to fall in 1990 to $494 billion, from $505 in 1989.
4) Despite the increase in total debt expected for 1990, the 
overall debt-export ratio is projected to fall slightly, from 186.6 
in 1989 to 183.1 in 1990.
5) The implementation of the Brady Initiative, in the cases of 
Costa Rica, Mexico, the Philippines and Venezuela, reduced 
commercial bank debt by $11.5 billion and debt forgiveness by 
bilateral creditors reduced debt by $5 billion, while the Paris 
Club provided increased debt service relief by lengthening 
maturities and grace periods.
6) The stock of arrears is expected to increase from $35.0
billion in 1989 to $42.2 billion in 1990, particularly because of
the continued growth in arrears on commercial banks' loans to 
several Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru, with the last three also 
exhibiting large arrears to multilateral lenders.
7) In 1989, Chile and Costa Rica achieved the remarkable 
accomplishment of graduating themselves out of the group of 
severely indebted middle income countries (SIMICs), with both 
countries experiencing rapid export growth. In the case of Chile, 
extensive debt-equity swaps and buybacks, applied from 1984 to 
1989, reduced commercial bank debt by 40 percent.
8) The depreciation of the dollar, in 1990, increased the
dollar value of the stock of debt denominated in nondollar
currencies by $46 billion, the largest factor in the increase of 
debt stock in the year.
9) Aggregate net resource flows to developing countries, 
including net flows of long-term lending, foreign direct investment 
and official grants, reached $71 billion in 1990, an increase of 
12.2 percent from the $63.3 billion of 1989. The main factor that 
explains this increase was the net lending from official sources to 
purchase collateral or buyback debt within the Brady Initiative.
10) Aggregate net transfers — the difference between aggregate 
net resource flows and servicing costs of the stocks of external 
capital, such as interest on debt and reinvested and remitted 
profits on the stock of foreign direct investment—  reached $9.3 
billion in 1990.
In order to achieve its full potential, the Brady Initiative 
is said to need "some fine tuning." First, because the operations
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already completed have taken some time, it will be necessary to 
obtain continued official support and additional official 
resources. Also, the Brady Initiative does not address the heavy 
burden of official debt and debt service that is particularly acute 
in the severely indebted low income countries. Finally, even before 
it was announced, there was a trend towards the transfer of risk 
from private to official creditors, that the Brady Initiative has 
accentuated. Consequently, caution is asked regarding the increased 
exposure of multilateral institutions, because their 
creditworthiness needs to be protected.
The analysis of the potential impact of the Gulf crisis on the 
debtor countries is centered on a projected increase in oil prices, 
that will affect negatively the vast majority of indebted 
countries, except for a few energy exporters. However, all debtors 
would be affected if, as a consequence, there is an outburst of 
inflationary pressures and higher interest rates in the creditor 
countries.
IV. 3. THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT. ACCORDING TO THE WORLD BANK 
(WDW/19/91 - 10 JULY 1991)
This year's World Development Report (WDR) is dedicated to the 
"challenge of development" and together with last year's on poverty 
and next year's on the environment, according to President Barber 
Conable, all form part of a trilogy that will "provide a 
comprehensive overview of the development agenda.” The World Bank 
thus performs the substantive role of agenda setter, acquired on 
account of its unparalleled expenditures on development research 
(WDW/12/91), as well as by its role of main provider of development 
finance (a record $22.7 billion in new commitments in FY 91).
To the credit of departing President Conable, this agenda 
comprises three basic issues: development, equity and
sustainability— quite a change from the years in which the Bank was 
under the spell of a single-minded orthodoxy. By contrast, the most 
salient trait of this year's WDR is the pragmatism it exhibits when 
it addresses the whole spectrum of development issues. In its own 
terms, "perhaps the clearest lesson from work on development over 
the past thirty years is that there is a premium on pragmatism and 
an open mind."
A few examples will suffice to illustrate this pragmatism that 
pervades this year's WDR. For instance, "the central issue in 
development, and the principal issue of the Report. is the 
interaction between governments and markets." However, far from 
taking sides, "this is not a question of intervention or laissez
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faire— a popular dichotomy, but a false one." Or better still, "it 
is not a question of state or market: each has a large and 
irreplaceable role."
Another example of this lack of ideological affiliation can be 
found in the treatment the Report gives to "government directed 
industrialization— financed from the proceeds of agriculture." By 
contrast with those that now attribute import substitution to a 
single culprit, the REPORT admits that "the major institutions (the 
United Nations, the World Bank, and several bilateral aid agencies 
forming part of Overseas Development Assistance) supported these 
views with varying degrees of enthusiasm."
Similar treatment is granted to the "remarkable recent 
achievements" of the newly industrialized economies of East Asia. 
Instead of portraying them as evidence of market success, the 
REPORT asserts that "these economies refute the case for 
thoroughgoing dirigisme as convincingly as they refute the case for 
laissez faire."
Finally, the role of the state is described in the following 
terms: "governments need to do less in those areas where markets 
work," while "at the same time governments need to do more in those 
areas where markets alone cannot be relied upon."
Welcome as it is, this pragmatic orientation cannot avoid 
certain pitfalls.
For instance, in an effort to downplay the role of external 
factors, several studies are mentioned that have found no 
relationship between "differences in growth rates and the magnitude 
of external shocks." Rather, it would have been more appropriate to 
recognize that economic performance is the result of the 
convergence of both external and internal factors and that there is 
no preordained proportion in which these factors exercise their 
influence.
The Report does not seem to have made up its mind between two 
alternative views on what it calls "thinking on development." On 
one side, it asserts that "progress has not moved along a straight 
line from darkness to light. Instead there have been successes and 
failures, a gradual accumulation of knowledge and insight." 
However, by opposition to this cumulative vision, at times, the 
Report seems to prefer the succession of contending paradigms as 
the best description of the "evolution of development thought." 
This begs the question, unfortunately left unanswered, if the "new 
thinking on development" constitutes a whole "new paradigm."
Finally, the narrative style adopted by the Report consists in 
the presentation of numerous individual cases to illustrate each 
and every generalization presented. This form of presentation,
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after a while, not only becomes tiresome, but proves that cases can 
be found within the development experience to support almost any 
generalization. In this way, the Report does not live to its own 
promise, that "in development, generalizations can be as rash as 
unbending commitments to theories," because "there is no magic 
cure," and "there is more than one way to succeed— if only because 
there are many different sorts of success."
The Report suggests an "agenda for action," spelling out the 
responsibilities of "the industrial countries, the developing 
countries and the donor community."
First, the industrial countries are asked to roll back 
restrictions on trade and to reform macroeconomic policy. Second, 
the multilateral financial institutions and the donor countries are 
asked to increase financing; to support policy reforms; and to 
encourage sustainable growth. Third, "the prospects of the 
developing countries are principally in their own hands," and for 
this purpose they need to: invest in people; improve the climate 
for enterprise; open their economies to international trade and 
investment; and get macroeconomic policy right.
To conclude, "the best hope for meeting the challenge of 
development" is found in those "strategies in which governments 
support rather than supplant competitive markets."
IV. 4. POVERTY REDUCTION REMAINS THE WORLD BANK'S BASIC MISSION 
(WDW/32/91 - 6 NOVEMBER 1991)
It is a recognition of the legacy of outgoing World Bank 
President Barber Conable that his successor, Lewis Preston, at the 
opening of the annual meetings, held in Bangkok, emphasized his 
personal commitment to the reduction of poverty, which he said 
remains the World Bank Group's "overarching objective." Paying 
tribute to his predecessor, Mr. Preston said: "he repeatedly
emphasized the importance of human and environmental aspects of 
development, and strengthened the Bank's work in these areas. And 
amidst the urgent need for economic adjustment, he rededicated the 
Bank to its fundamental objective of reducing poverty."
Ever since the 1990 World Development Report (WDR) was 
dedicated to world poverty, the signal was sent that the World 
Bank, under the stewardship of President Conable, had moved away 
from relatively more ideological issues towards the "ultimate 
objective" of reducing poverty.
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In accordance with this "fundamental imperative," one of the 
last policy papers prefaced by President Conable, Assistance 
Strategies to Reduce Poverty, was issued last August. The paper 
recalls the main elements of the proposal outlined in the 1990 WDR, 
with the purpose of showing how the strategy to reduce poverty can 
be "fully integrated into Bank operations."
Beyond the discussion about the soundness of the strategy, or 
the completeness of its constitutive elements, the fact that the 
main source of development finance has outlined the way in which it 
will incorporate the reduction of poverty into its operations 
assures that this objective will become cardinal for the global 
development agenda.
The paper recalls the two basic elements of the strategy. 
First, the encouragement of "broadly based economic growth," by 
means of making productive use of labor, "the poor's most abundant 
resource." The means identified to carry out this objective are the 
establishment of "incentive structures," such as competitive 
exchange rates and avoidance of excessive protection of 
manufacturing, to encourage agriculture and labor-intensive 
manufacturing. This is not considered enough, it is also necessary 
that public expenditures support "the activities in which the poor 
are engaged," ensuring that the delivery of services, such as 
roads, irrigation and extension services, is not biased against the 
poor.
Second, recognizing that even if growth generates 
opportunities, it is still essential that the poor have access to 
basic social services, such as primary education, basic health care 
and family planning, by "systematic investment in the development 
of human resources."
Finally, vulnerable groups will still remain, the two-part 
strategy needs to be complemented with social safety nets, designed 
to relieve temporarily the symptoms of poverty, by providing "some 
form of income insurance to help poor people through short-term 
stress and calamities."
Thus, the two basic elements of the strategy— efficient, labor 
absorbing growth and the provision of social services— are aimed at 
moving people permanently out of poverty, while the complement—  
well-targeted transfers and social safety nets— aims at the 
provision of temporary relief.
The paper describes how the Bank intends to make the strategy 
an integral part of its lending operations. First of all, instead 
of "targeted operations," the Bank's efforts must be comprehensive. 
And second, rather than spelling out a single blueprint, the Bank 
prefers to outline a process to carry out country specific 
solutions.
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With this purpose, the Bank intends to carry out periodical 
assessments of the appropriateness of public policies, focusing on:
1) the effectiveness of economic management in generating growth 
that makes productive use of labor; 2) the adequacy of government 
efforts to provide basic social and infrastructural services to the 
poor; and 3) the extent, reliability, and affordability of social 
safety nets.
These periodic assessments will provide the basis "to ensure 
that the volume and composition of Bank assistance supports and 
complements the efforts of individual countries to reduce 
poverty."
Consequently, recognizing the need for "country specificity," 
two general principles will be observed in Bank assistance 
strategies: 1) "the volume of lending should be linked to a
country's effort to reduce poverty;" and 2) "the composition of 
lending should support efforts to reduce poverty."
Furthermore, all "loan documents on investment operations" 
will form part of what has been renamed as the "Program of Targeted 
Interventions," previously known as the "Core Poverty Program." For 
operational purposes, the inclusion of a project within the Program 
of Targeted Interventions will be based on the recognition that it 
meets at least one of the following two criteria: 1) "a specific 
mechanism for identifying and reaching the poor;" and 2) "where no 
such mechanism is used, the participation of the poor in the 
project significantly exceeds the countrywide incidence of 
poverty."
Finally, the report outlines ways to improve the information 
system for analyzing poverty, with or without large-scale household 
surveys and summarizes some of the main recommendations that will 
have to be carried out to implement the proposed approach.
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V. TRADE
V. 1. THE EXTENSION OF FAST TRACK AUTHORIZATION 
(WDW/9/91 - 13 MARCH 1991)
On March 1, President Bush sent to Congress a formal request 
for renewal of the fast track authorization, on the basis of which 
the United States is carrying on several trade negotiations.
As indicated by the President, fast track authority is 
necessary because it provides two guarantees essential for the 
success of these negotiations. First, it allows for a vote on 
implementing legislation within a fixed period of time; and second, 
no amendments can be introduced to the proposed agreement.
The fundamental reason is that trade agreements are 
particularly vulnerable to what are known as "killer amendments.” 
Because results in one area are linked to other areas, even a minor 
amendment can unravel the entire agreement by altering the balance 
of benefits contained in the package as a whole, rather than in 
each one of its parts. In other words, fast track procedures 
guarantee that the agreements submitted to Congressional approval 
are pondered globally, instead of from the narrower angle of the 
special interests affected.
By granting this authority to the President, the trade 
negotiators can reassure their counterparts that the agreement 
voted by the Congress is the one approved at the negotiating table. 
"Without this assurance,” states the President's Report, "foreign 
governments are reluctant to negotiate with the United States and 
will not make the tough concessions necessary to reach agreements." 
In other words, "no negotiating partner will give its bottom line 
knowing that the bargain could be re-opened."
The need for fast track authority is also a consequence of the 
peculiar relationship that prevails in the United States between 
the legislative and the executive branches of government. The 
President's Report refers to this relationship as the "new 
partnership" that emerged in the aftermath of the record-high 
tariff rates that contributed to the Great Depression, approved in 
what is known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.
Recently, fast track procedures were used to negotiate what 
are characterized as "three remarkable trade agreements." First,
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the results of the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations of 1979;
second, the free-trade agreement with Israel of 1985; and third, 
the free trade agreement with Canada of 1988.
Under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
(Section 1103, b, 2), the President was granted fast track
authority to complete the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations by 
December 1990. The law also states that the presentation of a
progress report to Congress reviewing the results achieved, as of
1 March 1991, allows the President to request the extension of fast 
track procedures for an additional two years. The House or the 
Senate have until 15 May 1991 to deny such a request, thereby 
terminating, on 31 May, the Presidential authority to negotiate 
trade agreements under fast track procedures. Otherwise, the 
extension of fast track authority will last, as originally 
prescribed in the Omnibus Trade Act, until June 1993.
In his message to Congress, the President enumerates the trade 
agreements for whose completion it is considered essential to have 
fast track authorization. First, the Uruguay Round negotiations 
with 107 nations, because they "offer rich opportunities to break 
down trade barriers and expand the scope of international trade 
rules." Second, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), with 
Canada and Mexico, characterized as a "historic opportunity," 
because it will "create growth and better jobs in all three 
countries, and will make us more competitive in the global 
marketplace." Finally and most relevant for all of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, "to take steps in the next two years toward 
fulfillment of the trade objectives of the Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative (EAI)," with the purpose of completing "a 
possible free-trade agreement or agreements with other Latin 
American countries." In this last case, the Report concludes that 
"fast track procedures for free trade agreements negotiated with 
Latin American countries will encourage reform and liberalization 
in Latin America and will further the objectives of the EAI."
Authorized observers had warned that if fast track 
authorization for the trade dimension of the Enterprise of the 
Americas was not requested, the proposal could well be considered 
a non-starter. The Report recognizes that "it is likely that few 
Latin American nations will be in a position to enter into FTA 
negotiations with the United States before June 1993." Even so, 
"the United States must continue to be able to respond to the 
increasing pace of economic liberalization in the region."
If the President obtains from Congress the extension of fast- 
track authorization, the credibility of the proposal to create a 
hemispheric free trade area, "from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego," 
will be enhanced. The responsibility would then be in the Latin 
American and Caribbean court, particularly concerning the most 
appropriate methods to respond to this negotiating offer. As the
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situation presently stands, the Report indicates that only "Chile 
could be a candidate for the negotiation of a free trade agreement 
within the period of fast track extension."
Finally, in response to those that tactically have come out 
against the extension of fast track authority (WDW/7/91), the 
Report states that "now it is not the time to dissolve.. .the 
special cooperation" between Congress and the Executive in trade 
negotiations, that has "endured for more than sixty years."
V. 2. THE U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 1991 
(WDW/10/91 - 20 MARCH 1991)
As mandated in Section 1641 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, "the President shall submit to the 
Congress during each calendar year (but not later than March 1) a 
report on A) the operation of the trade agreements program ... and 
B) the national trade policy agenda for the year in which the 
report is submitted." Both appear in a single volume issued by the 
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), on 28 February 1991.
The objectives of this year's agenda are the same three of 
last year, except for the addition of a fourth objective that 
constitutes a prerequisite for the attainment of the others.
The first three broad objectives are grouped under the 
following headings:
A) "to strengthen and expand the international trading system 
through the conclusion of an ambitious Uruguay Round agreement with 
107 nations under the GATT."
B) "to complement Uruguay Round goals and agreements by 
undertaking regional and bilateral market-opening and market- 
expanding initiatives such as the historic North American Free 
Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada, and the President's 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative."
C) "to enforce and implement U.S. trade laws in ways that best 
advance the goals of open markets and expanded trade."
Finally, "in order to achieve these goals, however," it is 
necessary to "first accomplish a fourth and crucial objective:"
D) "the extension of fast-track negotiating authority from 
Congress for another two years" (WDW/9/91).
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The completion of the Uruguay Round is considered "the best 
means of strengthening the multilateral trading system," through:
- lower tariff and non-tariff barriers worldwide and to 
eliminate these barriers completely in key sectors;
- international rules of fair play in the new areas of 
services and investment, and to protect intellectual property;
- the reform of agricultural trade by opening global markets 
and reining in costly trade distorting agricultural subsidies;
- the integration of developing countries into the global 
trading system; and
- strengthening international rules on dispute settlement, 
subsidies, antidumping and import safeguards, to expand access to 
foreign markets and ensure fair trade in the U.S. market.
The regional and bilateral initiatives complement the Uruguay 
Round and are classified under geographic and sectoral headings.
Mentioned in first place this year, instead of the Pacific 
Rim, are several initiatives in the Western Hemisphere, with the 
negotiation of a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) with Canada 
and Mexico (WDW/7-8/91) appearing at the top of the agenda, 
followed by the "advancing of the President's Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative (EAI)."
NAFTA is expected to strengthen already existent economic 
interdependence, as well as "to increase regional political 
stability, and create new opportunities for U.S. exporters." It is 
also expected to send a wider message, giving "other countries 
greater incentives to seek open markets."
The EAI is characterized as "an historic initiative to join 
all nations of the Americas in a new, open economic relationship." 
As a first step in the direction of the "creation of a zone of free 
trade extending from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego," based on a 
prototype, the United States is "negotiating framework agreements 
on trade and investment," to achieve "improvements in the 
protection of intellectual property rights, more open investment 
regimes, reductions in export subsidy practices, and improvements 
in market access for goods and services."
Finally, also mentioned in the Western Hemisphere are the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Andean Trade Initiative.
The Pacific Rim is listed immediately afterwards, with Japan, 
Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
specifically mentioned.
In the case of Japan, the "top priority" is described as 
"expanding access to the world's second largest market economy," by
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means of the Uruguay Round, the Structural Impediments Initiative 
(SII), and by eliminating barriers in specific sectors. The 
objective with Korea is "to ensure that its growing market is 
accompanied by expanded access for imports." Finally, in the case 
of ASEAN, the signature of a memorandum of understanding in 
December 1990 is expected to facilitate the creation of mechanisms 
"for enhancing trade and investment relations."
Concerning Europe, with a view to 1992, the U.S. is 
"monitoring with special interest" the following areas: 
telecommunications, government procurement, financial services, and 
testing and certification. In the case of Eastern Europe, the 
purpose is defined as "to integrate the emerging market 
economies... into the open global trading system."
Sectoral priorities comprise steel and shipbuilding and 
existing trade laws will be used to complement the "multilateral 
and bilateral objectives of free markets and fair trade."
Briefly, the main highlight of this year's agenda is the 
recognition by the USTR that "in the past two years there has been 
a remarkable turnabout in economic policy orientation in the 
hemisphere." In response to this trend, the Western Hemisphere 
appears at the top of the regional trade policy priorities of the 
United States.
V. 3. FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS TO U.S. EXPORTS 
(WDW/15/91 - 22 MAY 1991)
It used to be that the presentation, every year on March 30, 
of what is known as the "National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign 
Trade Barriers," by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR) , was anticipated with considerable expectation. According to 
section 1304 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
the countries that appeared listed in the Report had to be 
submitted to scrutiny under the much dreaded "super" and "special" 
301 provisions of the 1988 Trade Act.
This expectation has decreased since the USTR's declaration of 
a "cease fire," on 27 April 1990, announcing that it was "not 
naming any new countries or practices as 'Super 301' priorities."
Still, this year's Report. as mandated, presents "an inventory 
of the most important foreign barriers to U.S. exports of goods and 
services and affecting U.S. investment and intellectual property
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rights." Trade barriers are defined broadly as "government laws, 
regulations, policies, or practices that either protect domestic 
producers from foreign competition or artificially stimulate 
exports of particular domestic products."
On the basis of this definition, the REPORT classifies 
"foreign trade barriers" in eight different categories: 1) import 
policies; 2) standards, testing, labeling, and certification; 3) 
government procurement; 4) export subsidies; 5) lack of 
intellectual property protection; 6) service barriers; 7) 
investment barriers; and 8) barriers that encompass more than one 
category or that affect a single sector.
The Report describes the barriers that U.S. exports confront 
in "the largest export markets for the United States," including 43 
nations and two regional trading bodies— the European Community and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council. Several countries are not listed, 
because of the "relatively small size of their markets or the 
absence of major U.S. industry and agriculture trade complaints." 
This year as last year, only six Latin American countries are 
listed: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. 
Finally, the Report contains an appendix describing those "market 
access issues in the financial service sector that the U.S. private 
sector brought to the attention of USTR." Also, for the first time, 
another appendix "provides an overview of the efforts made to date 
in the Soviet Union and six Eastern European nations toward 
economic reform and market liberalization."
Measured by the length of the citations, Japan ranks first 
with 17 pages, followed by the European Community and Canada with 
fourteen and thirteen pages, respectively, while Korea and Mexico 
appear each with nine pages and Brazil with seven pages.
Listed alphabetically, the enumeration of the barriers is 
preceded by ranking each country and regional grouping according to 
its relative importance as an export market, the amount of the U.S. 
trade deficit or surplus, as well as by the amount of U.S. exports 
and imports and of U.S. foreign investment.
Not all the citations that appear are negative. For instance, 
Argentina is commended for the import liberalization measures 
approved as "part of a sweeping trade reform" that the government 
has been implementing since 1989. However, under "lack of 
intellectual property protection" are mentioned pharmaceutical 
products and computer programs. Also, under services barriers 
appears the lack of access of U.S. insurance providers to major 
segments of Argentina's insurance market, as well as the fees 
levied on private international air courier shipments.
Brazil is also commended for the approval of a new tariff 
schedule, while the Report criticizes the requirement of denying
49
import licenses to 47 categories of equipment in computer hardware 
and related digital electronics equipment. Also mentioned are 
certain rules for government procurement, lack of patent protection 
for chemical compounds and foodstuffs, as well as for 
chemical/pharmaceutical substances. Services barriers are 
identified in insurance, data processing, telecommunications and 
motion pictures, while certain investment barriers in different 
sectors are characterized as "often restrictive and 
discriminatory."
Chile is one of the countries that exhibits the cleanest 
record, for following liberal trade and investment policies and for 
not subsidizing exports. Only certain deficiencies in the newest 
patent law, approved in May 1991, are considered objectionable.
The Colombian government is commended for its "apertura" 
program, because "it has progressed at a faster pace than 
anticipated." Even so, under criticism appear several export 
subsidies, government procurement practices and lack of 
intellectual property protection, as well as service and investment 
barriers.
A description of the current trade negotiations with Mexico 
precedes the positive identification of the removal of several 
government procurement practices, better coverage of intellectual 
property protection, as well as the liberalization of sectoral 
investment rules.
Finally, the Report describes approvingly Venezuela's reforms 
adopted as a result of the application of a World Bank-IMF program, 
as well as of its recent GATT membership.
Briefly, on balance, the scorecard of the Latin American 
trading partners mentioned in the Report recognizes and commends 
the unilateral liberalization that is taking place throughout the 
region.
V. 4. FAST TRACK APPROVED (WDW/16/91 - 29 MAY 1991)
In what is considered "a major victory," the Bush 
administration last week was granted authorization to continue 
negotiating the Uruguay Round, the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) and the trade dimension of the Enterprise for the Americas.
Both, the House of Representatives, last Thursday, by a margin 
of 39 votes — 231 to 192—  as well as the Senate, last Friday, by 
a margin of 13 votes — 59 to 36—  defeated a resolution that would
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have canceled, by June 1, the automatic renewal of fast-track 
authority. Thus came to a conclusion the intense lobbying effort 
carried out by supporters and opponents, that started even before 
March 1, when President Bush submitted the formal request for 
extension of the fast track negotiating authority (WDW/7,8,9/91).
Initially, the opposition appeared very solid and effective. 
It was constituted by organized labor, the industrialized mid 
section and southern textile states, some Florida and California 
vegetable and citrus growers, as well as by an impressive array of 
loudly assertive environmental groups.
The story of how this formidable coalition was defeated is yet 
to be written and it should be mandatory reading for all those 
interested in negotiating free trade agreements with the United 
States. However, several factors can be immediately identified to 
explain the outcome.
As Sidney Weintraub anticipated a decade ago, "the principal 
impediment to free trade in North America is political...this 
impediment cannot be overcome by intellectual argument."
First of all, among those confronting the opposition were 
several prominent leaders of both the Republican and the Democratic 
parties from the border states, including the Secretaries of State 
and Commerce and none other than the influential chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee, Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex). This revealed that 
party alignments were broken along unusual regional lines, with the 
southern border states strongly in favor, while the Northeast and 
the Midwest were divided.
Analysts have concluded that this also represents a 
recognition of the importance that the Hispanic vote will play in 
the coming elections of 1992, particularly the decisive electoral 
votes from the states of Texas and California.
This explains, as well, the split among the Democrats that in 
the end led to the approval of the extension of fast track 
authority. For instance, in the House of Representatives 91 
Democrats joined 140 Republicans in favor, while only 21 
Republicans joined 170 Democrats in the opposition. In all, in the 
House, the Democrats voted almost 2 to 1 against the authorization. 
In the Senate, the Democrats in favor were from southwestern and 
sea coast states, as well as others interested in the expansion of 
agricultural exports.
However, the most politically significant support among the 
Democrats came from several presidential hopefuls, particularly 
from the House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (Mo.), as well as 
from Senators Albert Gore (Tenn.) and John D. Rockefeller (W. Va.). 
As admitted after the vote by the AFL-CIO legislative director,
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Robert McGlotten, "it is very difficult to win a vote against the 
House Leadership."
Also impressive was the fracture of some of the most effective 
lobbying groups, as the textile lobby split along textile-apparel 
lines, while agricultural interests split between exporters and 
producers for the local markets. Even the environmental groups, the 
most assertive newcomers to the debate over free trade, suffered a 
debilitating setback when, for instance, the National Wildlife 
Federation and the National Resources Defense Council came out in 
support of fast track.
There is also agreement that what turned the tide was the 
letter sent by President Bush to Senator Bentsen, copied to 
Representatives Gephardt and Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) and to every 
member of Congress, whereby the President personally committed 
himself "to close bipartisan cooperation in the negotiations and 
beyond." Also, President Bush offered that "efforts at economic 
integration will be complemented by expanded programs of 
cooperation on labor and the environment.*
Last but not least, there was the very effective lobbying 
effort organized by the Mexican government in Washington D.C., 
directed by the "Office for Free Trade Agreement Negotiations," 
located not far from K Street, but physically separate from the 
Mexican Embassy. This office hired some of the most prominent 
public relations, lobbying and law firms in the city, in an 
impressive effort estimated to amount to $100 million in budgeted 
resources.
With the approval of fast track authorization the Uruguay 
Round and the NAFTA negotiations became real prospects, as well as 
the hemispheric-wide trade negotiations signalled by the Enterprise 
for the Americas Initiative. Therefore, Latin American and 
Caribbean governments interested in the creation of a hemispheric 
free trade area will have to monitor very closely the evolution of 
the NAFTA negotiations.
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VI. INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
VI. 1. THE OPPOSITION TO FREE TRADE WITH MEXICO 
(WDW/7/91 - 27 FEBRUARY 1991)
The debate in the United States about the negotiations of a 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is disproving the widely 
held assumption that trade relations among unequal partners fatally 
end-up in a pre-ordained, zero-sum, outcome to the advantage of the 
strongest, the largest or the more developed.
To the surprise of many believers in this "univocal 
determinism," formidable opposition has appeared against the 
request submitted by President Bush, on September 25, 1990, to
obtain "fast track" authorization to negotiate NAFTA's creation 
with Mexico and Canada. Such authorization allows Congress only the 
possibility of approving or rejecting, without amendments, already 
negotiated agreements. Consequently, the decision has become 
entangled with the "fast track" authorization that the Executive 
has been using to negotiate the Uruguay Round and whose renewal has 
to be requested before March 1 of this year.
The contenders are pitted according to the traditional 
cleavage that separates free traders from protectionists, although 
certain newcomers to the ranks of the opposition are contributing 
to the debate's alacrity and fascination. Tactically, instead of 
focusing on the agreement itself, the opponents have targeted the 
request for renewal of the "fast track" authorization.
On the side of the protectionists can be found some expected 
heavy-weights. Mr. Thomas R. Donahue, secretary-treasurer of the 
powerful American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), in recently held Senate hearings, 
denounced that "the enactment of a free trade agreement with 
Mexico, as proposed by President Bush, would be an economic and 
social disaster for U.S. workers, and their communities." 
Furthermore, opposition to the agreement constitutes the top 
legislative priority of the AFL-CIO for 1991.
Also powerful and extremely effective are the textile and 
footwear manufacturers. Mr. Donald Hughes, President of the U.S. 
Textile Institute declared: "we are deeply concerned about the
proposed free trade pact with Mexico, which could lead to import 
increases into this country that would significantly displace 
domestic sales and jobs."
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Certain agricultural interests, particularly sugar cane and 
beet producers, as well as certain producers of fresh fruit and 
winter vegetable growers, have also voiced their opposition. The 
Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association sent a letter, co-signed by 
more than two dozen produce associations from Florida, California 
and New York, to Congressman Bud Cramer (D-Ala) stating that the 
proposed free trade agreement "will be devastating for many 
individual (U.S.) growers, and will adversely impact national and 
regional economics." Additionally, numerous small farmer 
organizations, through Mr. Brian Ahlberg, spokesman of the National 
Family Farm Coalition, declared that "small farmers are convinced 
that the free trade agreement will push down commodity prices and 
force farmers from their land." Mr. Ahlberg also predicted that 
"many large farm groups would eventually join in opposing the 
agreement."
Chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturers, computer software 
publishers and the recording industry are also asking for reforms 
in Mexico's legislation on intellectual property rights. The 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association poses as a requirement for 
the free-trade talks that Mexico undertake patent law reforms, 
because a spokesman says that its "members are worried that Mexico 
is holding out on that reform as a bargaining chip in the talks."
Some of the newcomers to the opposition to the free trade 
agreement are contributing new dimensions to the debate and some of 
the most actively opposed are several quite effectively outspoken 
environmental groups. The argument is that differences in 
environmental standards generate unfair trade advantages, because 
investments will go where these standards are less demanding. As 
expressed by the National Wildlife Federation, the free-trade pact 
"will allow U.S. companies to evade U.S. pollution laws by 
manufacturing in Mexico, where regulations are much looser." 
Consequently, concluded Mr. Craig Merrilees from the National 
Toxics Campaign, "what we need is a trade agreement that will 
promote social and environmental justice on both sides of the 
border."
Regional differences have also appeared among legislators from 
different parts of the United States. For instance, from the border 
states, Senators L. Bentsen (D-Tex) and D. DeConcini (D-Arz) and J. 
McCain (R-Arz), have come out in favor of the agreement, while D. 
Riegle (D-Mich.) fears that differences in "wage rates will make 
manufacturing jobs slide away to Mexico."
Last but not least, opposition to the free trade agreement has 
come from six Mexican intellectuals, in the form of a letter to the 
Mexican Congress that has been circulating in Capitol Hill as well. 
Among the signers of this letter appear internationally-known 
personalities, such as novelist Carlos Fuentes and economist Jesus 
Siva-Herzog. As declared by one of the signers, UNAM Professor
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Jorge Castaneda, "we suggest that negotiations for an agreement be 
taken more slowly and not be subject to political calendars."
If this formidable array of opponents looks impressive, the 
forces in favor of the agreement look, if not more, at least as 
impressive. To mention only a few major business groups, the 
Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Association of Manufacturers have all come out in favor of the free 
trade agreement. Stay tuned, the results will be known soon.
VI. 2. THE SUPPORTERS OF FREE TRADE WITH MEXICO 
(WDW/8/91 - 6 MARCH 1991)
The opposition to the free trade agreement (FTA) with Mexico 
scored some early points even before President Bush made the formal 
request, on March 1, for extension of the fast-track negotiating 
authority (WDW/7/91). By contrast, the supporters, coming from 
behind, are asserting their viewpoints at a slower pace, although 
with equivalent intensity.
Still, the idea of free trade with Mexico has been around for 
some time. Among its earliest supporters is University of Texas 
Professor Sidney Weintraub, who wrote an article for the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), in 1981, concluding that "for 
both Mexico and Canada, bilateral or trilateral free trade would 
permit a reduction in protectionism without opening their markets 
completely to all countries, and it would provide their industries 
with the opportunity to compete in the large North American market 
without fear of protection."
Also in favor of extending free trade throughout the 
Hemisphere, MIT Professor Rudiger Dornbusch, at a seminar sponsored 
in 1989 by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), asserted that 
"Latin America should seek bilateral trade opening in the way 
Mexico and the United States appear to be negotiating now. The 
economic benefits are clear and the political costs in terms of 
sovereignty lost are insignificant."
To confront the opposing, heterogenous coalition, those groups 
that have come out in favor include some very powerful business 
organizations, such as the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee, 
sponsored by the Council of the Americas, in association with the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Chamber of Commerce of 
Mexico.
A comprehensive study requested by the Committee from the 
Policy Economics Group, of the accounting and economics consulting
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firm KPMG Peat Marwick, concludes that the FTA represents a 
"substantial 'win-win' proposition for both the United States and 
Mexico." In the terms of Salomon Brothers Managing Director, Thomas 
Enders, "this study conclusively shows that a Free Trade Agreement 
with Mexico will provide a boost to the U.S. economy. Investment is 
the key. If Mexico further liberalizes and codifies its rules 
through the FTA, a major boom will occur there. That will be good 
for us as well as for them.”
The Business Roundtable, an association of Chief Executive 
Officers of 200 major corporations, "strongly believes that it is 
in the mutual interest of the United States and Mexico to negotiate 
a bilateral trade and investment agreement." The following five 
reasons are cited by the Roundtable for supporting the opening of 
negotiations under "fast-track" authority: 1) the bilateral trade 
and investment relationship is already very important for both 
countries; 2) closer economic ties will generate many important 
benefits for both countries; 3) the dramatic economic reforms 
undertaken by Mexico; 4) these reforms are evidence of "a 
fundamental rethinking of Mexican attitudes towards the United 
States;" and 5) piecemeal agreements have not gone far enough in 
the direction of expanding market opportunities on both sides of 
the common border.
Other powerful business groups that have come out in favor of 
free trade are the National Association of Manufacturers and the 
U.S. Council for International Business, as well as major 
agricultural organizations, such as the American Farm Bureau. All 
of these organizations, on February 6, 1991, the date of initiation 
of hearings in the Senate Finance Committee, displayed unusual 
strength by having 436 other associations sign a letter addressed 
to every member of the U.S. Congress in support of the extension of 
fast-track authority. This proved, according to the Business 
Roundtable, that "support among American business is broad, diverse 
and deep."
Offering a relatively more balanced perspective, the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC) estimates that a free trade 
agreement with Mexico "will benefit the U.S. economy overall by 
expanding trade opportunities, lowering prices, increasing 
competition, and improving the ability of U.S. firms to exploit 
economies of scale." Furthermore, "since these gains are likely to 
outweigh the costs, the U.S. economy will probably gain on net," 
with horticulture as the only industry that, according to the ITC, 
would be the "most affected by an FTA with Mexico."
The ITC concludes that, given the relative size of the 
participating economies, "the benefits relative to the size of the 
U.S. economy are likely to be small in the near to medium term." 
After all, "Mexico is the United States' third largest trading 
partner, after Canada and Japan, but it accounted for just 6
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percent of U.S. imports and 7 percent of U.S. exports in 1989." In 
these terms, what is at stake is much more important for Mexico 
than for the United States. Or, as asserted by the ITC, "the 
relative magnitude effects of an FTA would be significantly smaller 
for the United States than for Mexico."
Perhaps the "bottom line" in this fascinating debate can be 
found somewhere else. As indicated by Sidney Weintraub a decade 
ago, "the principal impediment to free trade in North America is 
political...this impediment cannot be overcome by intellectual 
argument." A U.S. Chamber of Commerce poll taken last week found 
almost half of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
still undecided about the renewal of fast-track authority. Also, 
last year, thirty seven senators led by E. Hollings (D-S.C.) and K. 
Conrad (D-N.D.) sponsored a resolution to deprive the President of 
fast-track authorization. We shall see.
VI. 3. PROGRESS IN THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS 
(WDW/17/91 - 26 JUNE 1991)
One year after the announcement by President Bush, on June 27, 
of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) several major 
events can be identified as evidence of the progress accomplished 
in the Initiative's different dimensions. First, preceded by 
unexpected controversy (WDW/7,8,9,16/91), the curtain was raised in 
the tripartite negotiations aimed at the creation of a North 
American Free trade Area (NAFTA). Second, on June 19, the youngest 
process of economic integration of the Hemisphere, known as 
MERCOSUR, signed a framework agreement on trade and investment with 
the United States. Third, with the exception of Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Panama and the thirteen members of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), all the other countries of the Hemisphere have 
signed bilateral framework agreements with the United States. 
Fourth, in the field of investment the United States and Japan have 
pledged $500 million each, as contributions to the Multilateral 
Investment Fund (MIF) created at the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB). Finally, Chile received the first investment policy 
loan from the IDB, to further the process of investment policy 
reforms.
Hosted by the Canadian Minister of International Trade, 
Michael Wilson and in the presence of the U.S.T.R. Carla Hills and 
of Jaime Serra Puche, Mexico's Secretary of Commerce and Industry, 
on June 12, the NAFTA negotiations began in a Toronto hotel. Two 
days later, the U.S.T.R. announced that 17 groups within six 
separate headings had been agreed to conduct the negotiations, 
under the supervision of the three chief negotiators, Emilio Blanco
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of Mexico, Julius Katz of the United States and John Weekes of 
Canada. The headings and the groups reveal the complexity of the 
agenda that is on the negotiating table. First, under market
access: tariffs and non-tariff barriers; rules of origin;
government procurement; agriculture; automobiles; and other 
industrial sectors. Second, under trade rules: safeguards,
subsidies and trade remedies; as well as standards. Third, under 
services: principles; financial; insurance; land transportation; 
telecommunications; as well as other services. Fourth under
investment: principles and restrictions. Finally, under separate 
headings, intellectual property and dispute settlement procedures.
This can still be considered a narrow agenda, since several
touchy issues were left out of the negotiations, such as Mexican
energy, Canadian culture and immigration to the United States.
The second major result accomplished during the EAI's first 
year took the form of the framework agreement signed by the four 
members of Mercosur — Argentine Foreign Minister Guido Di Telia; 
Brazilian Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek, Paraguayan Foreign 
Minister Alexis Frutos Vaesken, and Uruguayan Foreign Minister 
Hector Gros Espiei—  and the United States. This agreement is the 
first signed with a group of countries, putting into practice the 
original preference for negotiating with groups of countries 
engaged in processes of economic integration. As with the others 
already signed, the framework agreement with MERCOSUR includes a 
declaration of trade and investment principles, as well as a 
decision to hold regular consultations on the basis of a commonly 
agreed agenda.
Beyond the significant recognition to Latin American 
integration, made evident by the signature of the framework 
agreement with MERCOSUR, the participation of Brazil reveals also 
a movement away from an initially skeptical position. This was the 
interpretation given to the invitation by President Bush to 
President Collor of Brazil, who was visiting Washington officially, 
to participate in the ceremony of signature of the framework 
agreement with MERCOSUR, which at President Collor's suggestion 
will be known as "The Rose Garden Agreement."
This contrasts with the skeptical attitude expressed by the 
Deputy Foreign Minister of Brazil, Marcos de Azambuja, not even two 
weeks before the General Assembly of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), dismissing the Initiative as "an outline of a 
program" about which "not so much was done to give it bone or 
muscle." By contrast, President Collor at the signing ceremony in 
the Rose Garden hailed the agreement as "a historic milestone that 
foreshadows a brighter and better future for generations to come."
The third major accomplishment within the Initiative's trade 
pillar can be found in the other bilateral framework agreements
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signed with Colombia (July 1990); Ecuador (July 1990); Chile 
(October 1990); Honduras (November 1990); Costa Rica (November
1990); Venezuela (May 1991) ; El Salvador (May 1991) ; and Peru (May
1991). Also, another framework agreement with a group of countries 
is expected to be signed with the 13 members of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) in July.
The other results registered during the first year of the 
Initiative can be found in the field of investment. These took the 
form of the decision announced by the United States and Japan of a 
contribution of $500 million each, to be disbursed in the next five 
years, to the Enterprise of the Americas Multilateral Investment 
Fund (MIF), created at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 
Similar pledges to the MIF from Canada, some members of the 
European Community and even Korea and Taiwan were expected in the 
near future. Also, on June 19, the IDB approved the first 
investment policy loan granted to the Chilean government to promote 
private enterprise by means of further investment policy reforms.
VI. 4. NAFTA STALLS (WDW/35/91 - 27 NOVEMBER 1991)
The vulnerability of trade policy to internal politics 
recently became evident, when it was learned that the negotiations 
to create a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) stalled, because 
of the results of the November 5 elections in the heart of what is 
known as "the Rust Belt." The voters of Pennsylvania overwhelmingly 
elected a Democrat, Harris Woolford, who ran on a "populist agenda" 
stressing the economy's difficulties, as well as the need for a 
national health insurance program and portraying free trade with 
Mexico as negative for U.S. employment levels.
Thus, the negotiations with Mexico and Canada have become the 
first casualty of the campaign for next year's election, which has 
already begun, amidst a recession that after all appears to be not 
as "short and shallow" as originally expected (WDW/6/91).
The economy, in Wall Street terms, bounced "like a dead cat," 
after two quarters of negative real growth that started in the last 
quarter of 1990. In the second quarter of this year, the economy 
declined slightly, but the recovery in the third quarter was so 
weak, at an estimated 2.4 percent before inflation, that consumer 
confidence is still down, the stock market is jittery, while new 
jobless claims are surging.
As described by the President's Chief Economic Adviser, 
Michael Boskin, "we're certainly looking at more moderate growth
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than even the moderate growth we anticipated." Also, President Bush 
said, to explain why he saw no urgency to act, "there's some fairly 
good fundamentals getting out there, inflation is down. Interest 
rates are down. Personal debt is down. Inventories are down. 
Quality— competitiveness— quality is going in the right direction, 
up, and exports are up. So it's not like we're dealing with a 
totally bad economy."
No immediate risk of a "double dip"— of the economy falling 
again into recession— is anticipated by authorized observers, such 
as the National Association of Business Economists (NABE). It is 
only that, in the present quarter, growth before inflation is 
projected to amount to 2 percent, while for 1991 as a whole it will 
be almost 3 percent.
According to The Washington Post, quoting "a senior official," 
an internal review by the Administration of the November 5 election 
results, carried out the next day, "concluded that negotiations on 
the [free trade] agreement will not be completed until after next 
year's election." The Post added that "the fact that administration 
officials even considered delaying one of President Bush's major 
economic proposals— a pact knitting together the United States, 
Canada and Mexico in a North American free trade agreement—  
indicates the level of concern among Republican strategists over 
charges that the White House has neglected the economy while 
pursuing foreign policy interests."
Still, as The Post indicated, "many key Bush advisers, notably 
Baker and Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher, say they believe 
that a North-American free trade agreement would be a political as 
well as economic plus for the president, allowing him to cut into 
the Democratic hold on Mexican-American voters in such pivotal 
states as California, Illinois and Texas."
By contrast, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills declared, 
on November 14, that while the talks still could be completed by 
the fall, "I don't want to bet next year's salary on it."
On the same day, at a conference sponsored by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Representative Jim 
Kolbe (R-Arizona) stated that President Bush's primary concern in 
1992 was winning the election and anything that could appear in the 
way of that objective would be placed in "the backburner." 
Additionally, Representative Kolbe said that even if the NAFTA 
negotiations concluded , with the signature of an agreement on 
January 1st., the legislative approval of such an agreement demands 
at least 90 legislative days. This would bring the final approval 
to around July, which would already be the peak of the political 
campaign.
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At the same conference, Senator Bob Graham (D-Florida) 
declared that, as a supporter of the extension of fast-track 
authority (WDW/9,16/91) , he agreed that it was better to wait until 
after the presidential election of November 1992, to avoid the risk 
of making the NAFTA agreement an electoral issue.
In these terms, the next Camp David retreat between Presidents 
Salinas and Bush, on December 14, is seen as the opportunity to 
decide on the postponement of the negotiations. As The Journal of 
Commerce said, the Camp David retreat, at least, will "serve to 
settle a disagreement within the Bush Administration over whether 
the negotiations should be put on ice during the coming election 
year."
Meanwhile, according to a New York Times/CBS News poll, only 
one in four presently approves the way President Bush is handling 
the economy, "a level of discontent unmatched since the days of 
double-digit inflation under President Jimmy Carter." Also, 
President Bush's overall job approval rating is at 51 percent, a 
drop of 16 percentage points since mid-October, attributed to a 
month of bad economic news and to a certain disarray in the White 
House team. Last but not least, for the first time, "when offered 
a choice between re-electing President Bush or some unnamed 
Democrat, 39 percent of registered voters said they would probably 
vote for the President, while 37 percent said they would probably 
vote for the Democrat."
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V i l .  THE ü IS P M T g g
VII. 1. THE RISE OF THE HISPANICS (WDW/23/91 - 4 SEPTEMBER 1991)
Sometimes it is overlooked that, after the Native Americans, 
the Hispanics are among the oldest settlers of what now is U.S. 
territory, particularly along the states that border with Mexico. 
Perhaps this is because there are also some Hispanics who have 
arrived more recently, such as the Puerto Ricans after the Second 
World War; the Cubans during the last thirty years; and the Central 
Americans throughout the eighties.
According to the first figures released by the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, during the eighties, the Hispanics were the fastest 
growing minority in the United States, from 6.4 percent of the 
total population in 1980 to 9 percent in 1990.
These figures hide even more spectacular increases, as in the 
State of California where the Hispanic population grew 70 percent, 
from 4.5 million in 1980 to 7.7 million in 1990. Thus, out of the 
30 million inhabitants of the State of California, in 1990, almost 
26 percent were Hispanics, up from 19.2 percent in 1980.
The composition of the Hispanic minority in the United States 
also changed drastically during the eighties. Mexicans still 
constitute two thirds of all Hispanics, the largest and one of the 
fastest growing segments, increasing by more than 50 percent during 
the eighties, to reach 13.5 million. Also, in 1990, 1 million
Cubans and 2.7 million Puerto Ricans represented 5 percent and 10.5 
percent of all Hispanics, respectively, with each also registering 
impressive increases of more than 30 percent.
However, the most spectacular increase during the eighties was 
experienced by a group classified in the census figures as "Other 
Hispanics," growing 66.7 percent, from 3.0 million in 1980 to 5.0 
million in 1990. This last category comprises mostly Central 
Americans, although it includes South Americans as well.
Despite some impressive gains, the Hispanics still lag behind 
almost any average U.S. social indicator. For instance, during the 
eighties, only modest gains were registered among the Hispanics in 
educational attainment, with the rate of progress even slowing down 
when compared to the seventies.
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In March 1983, almost 16 percent of Hispanics had completed 
less than five years of schooling, while in 1990 only 12 percent 
had done so. About 51 percent of all Hispanics completed four or 
more years of high school in 1990, compared with almost 78 percent 
of the total U.S. population. In 1983, 8 percent of Hispanics
completed four or more years of college, compared to 9 percent in 
1990, which contrasts with 21.3 percent of the total U.S. 
population.
In March 1990, the unemployment rate among Hispanics was 8.2 
percent, higher than the 5.3 percent that prevailed among non- 
Hispanics. In 1989, the median money income of Hispanic households 
was $21,900, compared with $29,500 for non-Hispanic households. 
This was higher than the Hispanic household median income for 1982, 
which amounted to $19,503 in 1989 dollars. Still, the median income 
of Hispanic families in 1989 was about 67 percent of the median 
income of non-Hispanic families, amounting to $23,400 and $35,200, 
respectively.
In 1989, 23.4 percent of Hispanic families lived in poverty, 
more than double the proportion of non-Hispanic families, amounting 
to 9.2 percent, which meant that one in every six persons living in 
poverty in the United States was Hispanic.
The question raised by the preceding figures is if the coming 
elections of November 1992 will see an increase in the political 
influence of Hispanics that is congruent with their numbers.
VII. 2. HISPANIC SHORTCOMINGS (WDW/25/91 - 18 SEPTEMBER 1991)
The impressive increases in numbers (WDW/23/91), experienced 
by the Hispanics during the eighties, have not translated 
themselves into more influence. In a sense, these shortcomings, 
added to the social disadvantages described, define the agenda of 
the nineties for this rapidly increasing minority.
One of the main limitations to Hispanic political 
participation is that a large proportion are still either "illegal 
aliens," or have not yet become naturalized citizens. Estimates of 
these percentages vary widely. For instance, the National 
Association of Latino Elected Officials estimated that, in the 1988 
presidential election, 4.9 million Hispanic residents were 
ineligible to vote, exceeding the 4.8 million who were registered 
to do so. Also, the same Association estimates that more than one 
third of all Hispanics living in the United States are "illegal 
aliens."
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Affecting their political participation, as well, Hispanics 
constitute the youngest segment of the U.S. population, with about 
30 percent under 15 years of age, compared to 21 percent of non- 
Hispanics. The same effect is caused by the Hispanics median age, 
at 26.0 years, about eight years lower than the median age of non- 
Hispanics, because among the youngest are found the lower 
percentages of political participation.
One of the indicators that illustrates better how the recent 
increase in the number of Hispanics has not immediately led to 
greater influence can be found in the 101st. Congress, where the 
Hispanic Caucus was constituted by nine voting members of the House 
of Representatives, three from Texas and three from California, as 
well as one each from Florida, New Mexico and New York.
In 1990, there were no Senators or Governors of Hispanic 
origin. In the past, only two U.S. Senators have ever been of 
Hispanic origin, both were from New Mexico— Dennis Chavez, from 
1935 to 1962 and Joseph Montoya, from 1964 to 1977. Also, since 
1900, there have been six state governors of Hispanic origin.
The record of Hispanic presence in the power structure of 
different cities is not better. For instance, during the eighties, 
Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside exhibited one of the fastest rates of 
growth in Hispanic population, a spectacular 73.4 percent, from 2.7 
million in 1980 to 4.8 million in 1990. Even so, only in February, 
1991, the Los Angeles County elected Gloria Molina to be the first 
Hispanic supervisor, and her election came only after a Federal 
Court ordered a redistricting that guaranteed the victory of a 
Hispanic candidate.
In Florida, Miami-Fort Lauderdale experienced also a 
spectacular increase of 70.4 percent in Hispanic population, from 
621,309 in 1980 to 1.06 million in 1990. Still, it was only after 
an impressive recruiting effort, basically aimed at helping Cubans 
gain citizenship, that the first Cuban ever, Ileana Rohs-Lehtinen, 
was elected to the U.S. Congress.
By states, the picture is equally bleak. California with 26 
percent of Hispanic population, has only three Hispanic Congressmen 
out of a total of forty five. Also, in the California state 
legislature only three out of forty senators and four out of eighty 
members of the state assembly are Hispanic. "This is shameful 
under-representation," according to Arturo Vargas from the Mexican- 
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund.
Finally, out of twenty seven seats in the House of 
Representatives from the state of Texas, with 24 percent of 
Hispanic population, only four are Hispanic. Also, with 19 percent 
of Hispanic population, no Hispanics occupy any of the five seats 
that Arizona has in the U.S. House of Representatives, while the
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State of New York, with 12 percent of Hispanic population, has only 
one Hispanic Congress person out of thirty four.
VII. 3. HISPANIC HETEROGENEITY (WDW/28/91 - 9 OCTOBER 1991)
It has been argued that one of the factors that acts against 
the attainment of national relevance by the Hispanics in the United 
States is their heterogeneity. First, the Hispanics are fragmented 
into at least four "communities," based on national origin—  
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and Central Americans— each with 
its own interests and identifications. Second, even within each 
community there exist profound differences on basic issues, such as 
bilingualism or immigration. Finally, these differences sometimes 
have been intensified by patterns of geographic settlement that 
have contributed to dispersion and fragmentation, such as the 
concentration of Mexicans in California and Texas, of Cubans in 
Florida and of Puerto Ricans in New York.
Other issues, given the decentralization that characterizes 
the federal system in the United States, are better dealt with at 
the state or even at the county level. Consequently, with the 
exception of immigration, the absence of the Hispanics is most 
conspicuous in some of the issues that form part of the national 
agenda, particularly those dealing with the external relations of 
the United States.
Be it as it may, the argument of Hispanic heterogeneity should 
not be carried too far. The three requirements that have been 
identified as necessary for a collective identity to exist, can be 
found among the Hispanics in the United States, despite their 
diverse national origins and decentralized patterns of geographic 
settlement. These three requirements are: first, there must be
self-identification, as well as a feeling of belonging to a 
distinct culture, as there must be objective recognition by others 
of this distinctiveness. Finally, these three constitutive elements 
of a collective identity must be present together, simultaneously.
Perhaps one of the reasons for doubting the existence of a 
Hispanic identity in the United States was the absence of the 
element of objective recognition. However, the categorization 
adopted since the 1980 census, by grouping those that come from 
certain countries together, beyond racial lines, has furnished this 
missing element.
For the second time, in the census, the Hispanics were singled 
out as a separate category, encompassing different racial 
identities. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, "persons
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of Spanish/Hispanic origin are those who classify themselves in one 
of the specific Spanish origin categories listed in the question—  
for example, Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban— as well as those who 
indicate they are of other Spanish/Hispanic origin. Persons 
reporting 'Other Spanish/Hispanic' are those whose origins are from 
other Spanish-speaking countries of the Caribbean, Central or South 
America, or from Spain, or persons identifying themselves generally 
as Spanish, Spanish American, Hispano, Hispanic, Latino, etc. 
Spanish origin and race are distinct; thus, persons of Spanish 
origin may be of any race."
Until 1970, the census classified Hispanics along racial 
lines. In the seventies, representatives of several Mexican- 
American organizations initiated a dialogue with the Bureau of the 
Census that led to the inclusion in the 1980 census of a separate 
question to classify separately those who self-identified 
themselves as Hispanics. Consequently, until the 1980 census, the 
Hispanic minority was objectively recognized. Since then, a person 
becomes Hispanic, beyond racial identification or national origin, 
only after crossing the Rio Grande.
Be it as it may, it remains to be seen if as a result of their 
spectacular increase in numbers and their objective recognition, 
the Hispanics will be able, in the nineties, to transcend their 
parochial differences and transform themselves into a cohesive 
participant in the debate about the national agenda.
The politically significant numbers that will allow the 
Hispanics to become an active minority are already there. A 
comparison at different times of the political map of the United 
States reveals that major changes have happened, during the second 
half of this century, in the patterns of population settlement. In 
1940, with 131.6 million inhabitants the most populous states were 
concentrated east of the Mississippi River, with New York, 
Pennsylvania and Illinois standing out. In 1990, with a population 
of almost 250 million, although large urban concentrations remain 
in the East, the most spectacular growth is found in the West 
Coast, as well as in Texas and Florida. These states will 
contribute a decisive number of electoral votes in the coming 
Presidential election and these are precisely the states that 
lately have experienced the most impressive growth in Hispanic 
population.
Additionally, beyond the parochial issues that are better 
dealt with at the county or the state level, to gain access to the 
normal trade-offs that take place to build the national agenda, or 
to gain national relevance, it is essential for a minority to 
become involved in foreign affairs. This is evident from the active 
participation of Jews in the defense of Israel, as well as that of 
Blacks in challenging apartheid in South Africa. External issues 
have the capacity of amalgamating even disparate national groups,
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to the point that it is around external issues that national 
coherence and cohesiveness are ultimately attained. Consequently, 
the passage into national relevance, beyond the parochialism of 
different national origins, will not happen unless the Hispanics 
are able to become active in foreign affairs.
VII. 4. THE HISPANIC VOTE (WDW/31/91 - 30 OCTOBER 1991)
The disclosure of the last U.S. Census figures has generated 
a fascinating political debate, as Republicans and Democrats 
compete to capitalize from the impressive changes in the number of 
Hispanics (WDW/23/91) . In 1990, the population of the United States 
reached almost 250 million. Large urban concentrations remained in 
the East, while the most spectacular growth was found in the West 
Coast, as well as in Texas and Florida. These states will 
contribute a decisive number of electoral votes in the coming 
Presidential election and these are the states that lately have 
experienced the most impressive growth in Hispanic population. 
Also, as a result of these changes, more than a dozen minority 
seats will be added to the House of Representatives, while many 
more will become available in state legislatures. Thus, in the next 
elections, addressing the elements of a Hispanic agenda has become 
almost unavoidable.
This is already happening and the name of the game is 
"redistricting." An intense debate is taking place about redrawing 
the political map of the United States on the basis of the figures 
of the 1990 census. At this point, nobody can be sure who will 
benefit from the outcome. However, just the release of the first 
census figures has already increased tensions between Republicans 
and Democrats, incumbents and prospective challengers, as well as 
between minorities.
One key aspect of the political history of any minority in the 
United States, as the Irish in Massachusetts, the Italians and the 
Jews in New York, or the Poles in Illinois and the Blacks 
throughout the country since the sixties, can be found in the 
efforts made to move them into the mainstream by means of their 
registration to vote. In these terms, it can be safely assumed 
that, this time, some cases of redistricting will clearly benefit 
the Hispanics, as the fastest growing minority.
For instance, the size of congressional districts will change 
in at least twenty one states. This will give California, Florida 
and Texas about one fourth of all the seats in the House of 
Representatives. Only California will have seven additional seats 
in Congress and Hispanics have been reported to be "already laying 
claim to four of them."
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What is not yet clear is which political party, if any, will 
come out a clear winner. It used to be that the Democratic Party 
was considered the most responsive to the interests of minorities. 
This is evident, for instance, from the fact that only one 
Republican appears among the nine voting members of the 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus— the recently elected representative 
from Florida.
Projecting from this situation, always a risky political 
exercise, could lead to the conclusion that the Democratic Party 
stands to benefit from the redistricting that is following the 
publication of the results of the 1990 census. However, this does 
not seem to be always the case. At least in one instance, in 
Chicago, the creation of a Congressional district dominated by 
Hispanics would take away enough votes as to endanger the powerful 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Dan Rostenkowski 
(D-Ill).
Contradicting the projection that the Democrats will benefit 
is the new activism practiced by the Republican Party in favor of 
redistricting. An "unusual alliance" is emerging that manifests 
itself, for instance, in the provision by the Republican Party of 
software packages to prepare minority groups for the "redistricting 
battles" that are expected to intensify. Also, the Justice 
Department has openly opposed a new redistricting plan for the New 
York City Council, saying that it "consistently disfavored" 
Hispanic voters. And in Houston, the Justice Department is trying 
to block in court the next City Council elections, because "the 
city's electoral districts discriminate against Hispanic voters."
Meanwhile, the debate has also reached the inner circles of 
the Republican Party, concerning what The Wall Street Journal in an 
editorial criticized as "racial gerrymandering," or what another 
observer characterized as "the GOP's Hispanic contradiction."
The issue is if the redrawing of districts to concentrate 
minorities will end up dividing the country along racial and ethnic 
lines. The hope of those Republicans in favor is that the drawing 
of minority districts will hurt the Democrats, given some 
impressive gains scored lately by the Republican Party, 
particularly among Hispanics.
By contrast, some prominent Hispanic Republicans, such as 
Linda Chavez, a former Reagan appointee as Executive Director of 
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, have come out openly against 
guaranteeing the existence of districts in which the Hispanics will 
constitute the majority. In this way, it is asserted, the Hispanics 
will never belong to the mainstream and they will remain "speaking 
their own language, living in protected enclaves, enjoying certain 
privileges based on disadvantage," instead of following the path of 
assimilation, as other successful minorities. Rather, the alterna-
6 8
tive is to bring the Hispanics into the mainstream, as it happened 
in the case of Governor Pete Wilson's victory in California, who 
von with 47% of the Hispanic vote.
In the end, as The Wall Street Journal editorialized, warning 
against the dangers of proportional representation, to force 
minorities into "electoral reservations" may have the opposite 
effect and "may wind up eroding minority influence in politics," 
because more whites will be elected without minority votes.
VII. 5. HISPANIC UNITY (WDW/33/91 - 13 NOVEMBER 1991)
Beyond definitions (WDW/28/91), certain recent organizational 
events indicate that there is movement in the direction of an 
increasingly coherent Hispanic participation in national issues.
First of all, according to Frank Cota-Robles Newton from the 
National Hispanic Agenda, concrete efforts at unification are 
taking place among several Hispanic organizations deliberately 
aimed at transcending the fragmentation caused by different 
national origins. The purpose is to bring together representative 
leaders from at least three of the most important segments of the 
Hispanic minority— Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans— into a 
single, umbrella organization.
These efforts towards unity have resulted in the creation of 
a new organization called the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda 
(NHLA), drawn out of the fusion of what were considered two of the 
most successful previous efforts aimed at unity: the National
Hispanic Leadership Conference (NHLC) and the National Hispanic 
Agenda (NHA).
The first of these unifying organizations, the National 
Hispanic Leadership Conference, was created in 1976 with the 
purpose of formulating, before every U.S. presidential election, 
what was known as "a consensus document on Hispanic affairs." Four 
of these documents were produced before every presidential election 
held in the United States since 1976.
The other unifying organization, the National Hispanic Agenda, 
was promoted in 1987 by the then Mayor of San Antonio, Texas, Henry 
Cisneros, with the purpose of uniting Hispanics around issues that 
required national attention.
The new umbrella organization, the NHLA, aims at the creation 
of "a structural base to provide Hispanic Americans with a clear, 
central voice and thereby, a more powerful impact on issues of 
public policy."
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The NHLA, has been described as the "most ambitious step to 
achieve national unity," undertaken by leaders "driven by the 
realization that Hispanics today are no longer a parochial 'special 
interest' group to be dismissed or ignored."
The "core concept" that inspired the creation of the NHLA is 
"inclusiveness," because "it seeks to transcend regional, 
political, national heritage and other special interests in order 
to address the needs of 'all' Hispanics."
The membership of the NHLA's Board of Directors includes an 
impressive list of twenty representatives of the most significant 
national Hispanic associations, as well as twenty five individuals 
representing elected officials, business leaders and other 
professionals.
The Board's functioning will be directed by six co­
chairpersons, listed alphabetically: Henry Cisneros, former mayor 
of San Antonio; Fernando Ferrer, Borough President, The Bronx, New 
York; Antonia Hernandez, President, Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, Los Angeles; Ileana Rohs-Lehtinen, member of 
Congress, Miami; Raul Yzaguirre, President, National Council of La 
Raza, Washington D.C.; finally, ex-officio, Solomon P. Ortiz, 
member of Congress, Texas.
The list of topics of major concern for the NHLA was drawn 
from the national conferences held, in 1988, by the NHLC and the 
NHA and includes the following issue-areas: 1) empowerment and
political participation; 2) education; 3) civil rights and justice
4) economic opportunity and business development; 5) health 
services; 6) immigration and relations with Latin America; 7) 
military service and veterans affairs; and 8) cultural affairs.
The mention of immigration and the relations with Latin 
America, side by side with other major domestic concerns, reveals 
that there exists an interest in having something to say about 
foreign affairs.
Finally, the NHLA will be endowed with a permanent staff, to 
carry out the following tasks: "1. Present, shape and advocate 
public policies on Hispanic issues based upon the consensus of 
Hispanic leaders and organizations across the nation; 2. Promote 
public awareness of Hispanic concerns by implementing a proactive 
media strategy; 3. Provide a network that coordinates the 
initiatives of national Hispanic groups by facilitating cooperative 
efforts, better communication and mutual support; 4. Organize 
regional and national conferences that identify, prioritize and 
analyze issues of major concern to Hispanics; 5. Maintain close, 
consistent communication with the Hispanic community, government 
offices, corporations, political groups and other public 
institutions about key Hispanic issues; and 6. Help Hispanic
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leaders engage in dialogues with the top decision-makers in 
government, industry, and other fields."
In conclusion, coupled with the objective recognition of the 
Hispanics as a minority since the census of 1980, as a logical 
seguence, now come the attempts towards organizational unity, to 
support a more coherent participation in national affairs. Also, 
these efforts demonstrate that a search is under way for an 
organizational alternative that can provide the Hispanics in the 
United States with the capacity to transcend their present 
heterogeneity and provincialism. Thus, the nineties will tell if 
the Hispanics will be able to transcend their national origins, 
demonstrating that they can become a cohesive and relevant 
minority. After all, a person becomes a Hispanic only after 
crossing the Rio Grande.
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VIII. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
VIII. 1. THE WORLD BANK»S RESEARCH PROGRAM 
(WDW/12/91 - 3 APRIL 1991)
During fiscal year 1990, expenditures on research activities 
at the World Bank amounted to $23.7 million to finance 131 staff 
years, up from $20.2 million and 122 staff years in FY89. These 
expenditures represented, during FY90, 17.5 percent of all the
analytical work undertaken by the Bank and accounted for 4.2 
percent of the Bank's administrative budget, up from 14 percent and 
3.5 percent in FY89, respectively. The other analytical activities 
performed by the Bank, not covered by the report because they are 
not considered research, are economic sector work which accounted 
for 54 percent and policy analysis 28 percent.
The FY90 report reminds specifically that "research at the 
Bank is different from research at universities and free-standing 
research institutes," because the "lending operations serve as a 
constant reminder to research staff that the real world is much 
more complex than the world of theory." However, there does not 
exist a "fixed relationship between research and operations, no 
single 'life cycle' for Bank's research."
The definition offered to describe the linkages between 
research and operations is narrower than the analytical economic 
work required to support operations. In these more narrow terms, 
Bank research includes only "analytical work designed to produce 
results with relatively wide applicability ... clearly motivated by 
policy concerns ... usually driven not by the immediate needs of a 
particular Bank lending operation or a particular country or sector 
report— but by longer term concerns." The main difference with 
academic research is that Bank research is "clearly directed toward 
a recognized policy issue in a way that will eventually yield 
better policy advice."
Two major sources of funding are available within the Bank to 
support research activities. First, the Research Support Budget 
(RSB), administered by a Research Committee, disbursed a record 
$6.4 million in FY90, compared with $3.6 million in FY89 and $4.0 
million in FY88. Added to staff time for $3.8 million, in FY90 
centrally funded projects amounted to $9.9 million, or almost 43 
percent of research expenditures. Second, departmental sources,
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mainly from the Policy, Research and External Affairs (PRE) 
complex, amounting in FY90 to $17.2 million, or 57 percent of 
overall research expenditures.
At the top of the agenda of FY90, absorbing 18 percent of the 
Research Support Budget, still appears debt and adjustment, down 
substantially from 28 percent in FY89. Poverty alleviation follows, 
with 10.5 percent; human resources, 9.4 percent; the environment
8.4 percent; public sector management and privatization 7.9 percent 
each; and other sectors that absorb slightly more than 2 percent, 
such as financial intermediation, food security, women in 
development, as well as 1.2 percent for AIDS.
Looking ahead to the early 1990s, the "overarching goal of the 
Bank's research is to reduce poverty," with emphasis in four 
program areas: the environment, private sector development, human 
resources, and debt and adjustment. Under the Vice-Presidency for 
Policy, Research and External Affairs (PRE), the following sectors 
are identified: agriculture and rural development; industry and 
energy; infrastructure and urban development; population and human 
resources; environment; country economics; and international 
economics.
Among regional priorities, those identified as "important 
areas of new work" for Latin America are: first, the comparative 
analysis of the size of governments, reform of civil services, and 
fiscal decentralization; second, "to draw lessons from experience," 
are mentioned trade reforms, social investment funds and adjustment 
programs. Finally, environmental concerns such as the reduction of 
pollution through changes in relative prices and administrative 
controls.
These research activities are accompanied by an impressive 
effort at dissemination and outreach, mainly oriented to "enhance 
the Bank's image as an intellectual leader in the field of 
development research." First, two widely circulated journals: The 
World Bank Research Review, with 13,000 subscribers and The World 
Bank Research Observer, with 5,700 subscribers. Second, the Policy 
Research Bulletin, launched in January 1990 as a successor to the 
Research News, distributed to 21,000 researchers, policymakers, and 
business people. Third, the Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, held each year at the end of April, 
dedicated in FY90 to stabilization and growth, sustainable 
development and the environment, population growth and development, 
as well as to a reexamination of project evaluation and, in 
anticipation of this year's World Development Report, a roundtable 
on development economics. Fourth, a program of Visiting Research 
Fellows hosted 13 researchers during FY90 on issues such as the 
political economy of structural adjustment; nontariff barriers; 
poverty alleviation and income distribution in structural 
adjustment. Fifth, nine papers were published under the Policy and
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Research Series on topics such as competition policies, industrial 
restructuring and agricultural diversification. More impressive 
still is the Working Paper Series, already approaching the number 
600, with 230 papers published during FY90. Finally, Bank 
researchers published externally, during FY90, 44 articles in
leading journals, 15 books, 51 technical papers and more than 300 
working papers.
VIII. 2. THE IMF-WORLD BANK SPRING MEETINGS 
(WDW/13/91 - 8 MAY 1991)
This year's Bank-Fund spring meetings, held in Washington from 
26 to 30 April, were dominated by two issues: the coordination of 
economic policies among the industrialized countries, as well as by 
the transition in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). 
Each one of these issues was addressed separately at the meetings 
of the Group of Seven and of the Group of Ten, respectively. The 
communiques of the Interim Committee and of the Development 
Committee essentially reflected the consensus or lack of it that 
resulted from the previous meetings. Finally, the communique issued 
by the G-24, as usual, commented on the items that appeared in the 
agendas of both the Interim and the Development Committees.
The fact that these two basic issues were dealt within the 
more restrained and homogeneous environment furnished by the G- 
Seven — the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States—  and by the G-Ten — the members of the G-Seven plus 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland—  did not 
necessarily mean that there prevailed more harmony and consensus.
The coordination of economic policies among the industrialized 
countries was tested by the request of the United States for a 
concerted lowering of interest rates. On the basis of the 
communique approved by the G-Seven, the hurried conclusion reached 
almost unanimously in the press was that, as depicted by the Wall 
Street Journal, the request had been "rebuffed."
However, in the terms of the cryptic language of the 
communique, in direct reference to Germany and Japan, the Ministers 
and Governors "noted the persistence of high real interest rates 
and the slowing of economic activity in those countries which until 
recently had been experiencing strong expansion." Further and more 
to the point, the key phrase reads: "against this background,
Ministers and Governors emphasized the importance of monetary and 
fiscal policies which provide the basis for lower real interest 
rates and a sustained global economic recovery with price
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stability." This qualifier with respect to price stability was 
attributed to Germany, while the assertion characterizing the 
policy stance as a "medium-term strategy" was interpreted as an 
indicator of disagreement about the immediate future.
Be it as it may, the following Monday morning, April 30, the 
Federal Reserve Board (FED) of the United States announced that it 
had lowered the discount rate to 5.5 percent from 6 percent. A few 
hours later, the FED also pushed down the Federal funds rate to 
5.75 percent from 6 percent. Finally, the next day, the largest 
commercial banks, led by citibank, Morgan Guaranty and the First 
National Bank of Chicago, decided to cut the prime lending rate 
from 9 percent to 8.5 percent.
Since Germany and Japan did not follow, the United States 
appeared left alone by the other industrialized countries, in a 
manifestation of what Hobart Rowen in THE WASHINGTON POST 
characterized as "a much broader disagreement," that placed 
economic policy coordination "at a dead end."
The other issue that dominated the meetings was tackled at the 
G-Ten and had to do with the transformation from command into 
market-oriented economies in the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC). The whole communique issued by the G-Ten was 
dedicated to this issue, amounting to a "manual of instructions," 
drawn from the report "Issues raised by the transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe," prepared by the Deputies of the G-Ten at their 
meeting of March 9.
By contrast, there was no agreement on the capital increase of 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), because the United 
States demanded more involvement by the World Bank Group in lending 
to the private sector. Thus, the Development Committee agreed "that 
there should be continued negotiations."
Other issues were mentioned, but not acted upon, such as the 
prospects of a world capital shortage, with the G-Seven stressing 
"the importance of policies aimed at increasing global savings," 
while agreeing only "to monitor the situation closely."
On the assistance to the highly indebted developing countries, 
disagreement prevailed about debt relief. The recent official debt 
writeoffs for Poland and Egypt were sharply criticized by the 
Japanese delegation, while the United States opposed a new issue of 
special drawing rights which the Japanese delegation previously 
hinted it might support.
For the first time under the chairmanship of Chile's Minister 
of Finance, Alejandro Foxley, the Development Committee declared 
that to reduce the incidence of poverty constitutes the "highest 
priority for the world development community."
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Probably as a departing tribute to President Barber Conable, 
who had raised the issue since 1989, the Development Committee 
pointedly emphasized "the need to reexamine the possible 
reallocation of public expenditures, including excessive military 
expenditures, to increase their impact on poverty reduction."
The Development Committee also "expressed its profound 
appreciation" to President Conable, "for the distinguished 
contribution he has made during his five-year term in office to the 
cause of development and the reduction of poverty in the developing 
world."
Finally, Mr. Peter Mountfield (United Kingdom) was appointed 
new Executive Secretary of the Development Committee, to replace 
Mr. Yves Fortin (Canada).
VIII. 3. THE WORLD BANK'S ANNUAL REPORT 
(WDW/26/91 - 25 SEPTEMBER 1991)
The 1991 Annual Report of the World Bank— for the fiscal year 
that goes from 1 July 1990 to 30 June 1991— in seven sections 
covers the following topics: 1) the Executive Board's activities;
2) a global perspective on the economic scene; 3) the Bank's 
operations; 4) the Bank's finances; 5) the activities of the World 
Bank Group, including those of the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA); and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID); 6) regional perspectives, with a segment
dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean; and 7) a summary of 
the projects approved during FY 1991.
1990 is characterized as "a year of setbacks," for several 
reasons. First, the end of the longest postwar economic expansion 
in the industrialized countries; second, the persistence of the 
slowdown in the growth of the volume of world trade from 9 percent 
in 1988, to 7.5 percent in 1989 and to only 5 percent in 1990; 
third, the interruption of the easing in oil prices, as a result of 
the Gulf crisis; and fourth, the inconclusive state of the Uruguay 
Round.
However, this overview also includes certain "promising 
developments," such as the concerted response to the Gulf crisis; 
the "quickening and deepening of economic reform in all the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe;" continued high growth in 
the developing countries of Asia; the pace of economic reform 
taking hold in sub-Saharan Africa; the completion of German 
unification; as well as "indications that, despite the Gulf crisis,
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the superpowers are likely to continue to reduce their military 
expenditures."
During FY 1991, lending commitments amounted to $21 billion, 
of which $16.4 billion from the Bank and $6.3 billion from the 
International Development Agency (IDA). Thus, the level of Bank 
commitments increased $1.2 billion, while IDA commitments increased 
by $800 million. In FY 1991, net disbursements from the Bank 
declined to $2.1 billion, down 63 percent from the $5.3 billion of 
FY 90. This drop in net disbursements was "caused, in part, by a 
decline during the year in Bank support for debt and debt-service 
reduction operations." IDA'S net disbursements increased $646 
million, to a total of $4.3 billion. Finally, overall net income 
increased from $1.05 billion to $1.2 billion.
Lending for human resource development— education combined 
with population, health and nutrition— stands out among the areas 
that received special attention, rising "dramatically" during FY 
91, from $2.4 billion the previous year to $3.8 billion. Also, 
lending to Eastern and Central Europe "rose sharply in FY91, 
totalling $2.9 billion, compared with $1.8 billion a year earlier."
Adjustment lending totaled $5.9 billion, or 26 percent of 
total commitments, including $215 million for debt and debt-service 
reduction assistance to Uruguay and Venezuela. The other $5.7 
billion in structural adjustment and sector-adjustment assistance 
represent an increase of $1.7 billion over the previous year, from 
20 percent of total combined commitments in FY90 to 25 percent. 
"Most of the increase was the result of increased adjustment 
lending to countries in Eastern and Central Europe."
In the segment dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the Report registers that "1990 continued to be depressed," with "a 
small decline in total output for the region as a whole, and per 
capita output fell for the third year in a row." Separately, the 
REPORT also describes the patterns of reforms, 1983-91; the lessons 
learned; debt and trade; and poverty alleviation.
In FY91, Bank's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean 
can be summarized as follows: 1) total new loan commitments
decreased from $6 billion in FY90 to $5.2 billion in FY91, in 
forty-four operations, partly as a result of a decline in lending 
for debt reduction, from $1.3 billion to $215 million. 2) 
Disbursements of $4.3 billion were considerably lower than the $6.3 
billion of last year, while repayments of $3.6 billion yielded net 
disbursements of $641 million. 3) Adjustment lending represented 3 0 
percent of total lending, shifting away from broad lending to 
sector adjustment, particularly in support of public sector and 
financial sector reforms. 4) The volume of cofinancing dropped from 
$4.1 billion in FY90 to $2.1 billion in FY91. The Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) was the largest source of cofinancing with
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fourteen operations for a total of $1.4 billion, while Japan 
remained the largest source of official bilateral cofinancing, 
through five operations for a total of $360 million from the 
Eximbank and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund.
During FY91, the membership of the Bank rose to 155 nations, 
with requests from Albania and Switzerland submitted by the end of 
the year, which meant that the Bank was approaching universal 
membership. Also, Lewis Preston, former chairman of J.P. Morgan, 
was appointed by the Board of Directors to succeed President Barber 
Conable, who resigned at the end of his five year mandate. Among 
Mr. Conable's achievements, besides capital increases for the Bank 
and IDA, prominently figures the placement of the reduction of 
poverty at the top of the Bank's agenda; gearing the Bank towards 
a more pragmatic stance concerning the relationship between the 
market and the state, as revealed in the last World Development 
Report (WDW/19/1991); as well as increased attention to 
environmental issues and to the integration of women into the 
development process.
VIII. 4. THE IMF'S ANNUAL REPORT (WDW/27/91 - 2 OCTOBER 1991)
The performance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
during the financial year that ends on April 30, is reviewed by the 
Executive Board in the Annual Report released every year before the 
annual meetings of the Board of Governors, to be held this year in 
Bangkok, Thailand, from October 12 to 17.
The first part of the Report contains an overview of the world 
economy, based on the World Economic Outlook (WEOÏ. originally 
released by the staff in May 1991 (WDW/14/91). The second part 
includes a review of the policies and activities of the Fund, under 
the following headings: surveillance; the external debt situation 
and strategy; financial support of member countries; trade policy 
issues; and financial operations and policies.
Surveillance of the members' policies and performance takes 
the form of regular consultations in which the Fund emphasizes 
balance of payments viability and sustainable noninflationary 
growth. However, "the process has broadened over time to include 
structural and other issues relevant to an understanding of broad 
macroeconomic issues and the context in which economic policies are 
developed and carried out." In these terms, three elements have 
been emphasized during the regular consultations: the need for a 
medium-term focus in corrective policies; the importance of raising 
domestic public and private savings and stimulating more productive 
investment; and the role of structural policies in enhancing 
economic performance by expanding productive capacities.
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Some of the most important conclusions drawn by the Board from 
the surveillance activities are: the recession that began in 1990 
in the industrialized countries will be "relatively short shallow 
and short lived." However, "a quick recovery is not assured," due 
to the fragility of financial systems, uncertainty in the Middle 
East, and the difficulties in Eastern Europe. By contrast, 
prospects for the developing countries, are less favorable, with 
the external environment deteriorating, due to the weakening of 
growth in the industrialized countries and the drop in non-oil 
commodity prices.
The review of the debt strategy by the Board highlights the 
value of the case-by-case approach; the importance of sound 
economic policies; as well as the vital role of bilateral 
creditors. By the end of the fiscal year, the Fund supported debt- 
and debt-reduction in seven countries: Argentina, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, the Philippines, Uruguay and Venezuela. The last 
four of these countries completed debt-reduction operations. While 
five other countries— Chile, Jamaica, Morocco, Niger and Nigeria—  
either reduced the stock of debt or negotiated agreements with 
commercial banks.
The financial support committed by the Fund to member 
countries, during the year, amounted to SDR 5.6 billion, under 
twenty new arrangements, much less than the SDR 11 billion 
committed during the previous year. Five of these new arrangements 
were with countries of the Western Hemisphere: Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guyana, Honduras and Uruguay. Two thirds of the total 
commitments, or SDR 3.6 billion, were made toward the end of the 
year to five Eastern European countries— Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania.
On trade policy, the REPORT considers "essential" the 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and sees "encouraging 
progress toward greater trade liberalization in Eastern Europe and 
in other developing countries."
The Fund’s financial operations included: 1) drawings
(purchases) rose substantially, from SDR 4.4 billion, the previous 
year, to SDR 6.2 billion in 1990/91. 2) Repayments (repurchases) 
decreased by SDR 0.6 billion, to SDR 5.4 billion. 3) A net transfer 
of resources to the member countries of SDR 0.8 billion, by 
contrast with last year's net transfer of resources to the Fund of 
SDR 1.6 billion. 4) Overdue financial obligations (arrears) rose 
modestly, to SDR 3.4 billion, the smallest increase since 1984/85.
5) Finally, for the performance of its activities the Fund 
employed, as regular staff, 1,763 persons from 104 countries, with 
a total administrative budget that increased to $278 million, from 
$259.9 million of the previous financial year.
* ' w
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The two salient events in Fund's activities during the year 
were the swift response to the crisis in the Middle East, as well 
as the assistance granted to Eastern Europe. Still, overdue 
financial obligations "remained a serious problem in 1990/91," and 
although no members were declared ineligible during the year, eight 
countries remained in arrears of six months or more, including Peru 
and Panama in the Western Hemisphere.
Finally, four new members were admitted during the year—  
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and Namibia— bringing total 
membership to 155 countries. Also, Albania and Switzerland applied 
for new membership. Great expectation was generated by the 
application for membership by the Soviet Union, which will not only 
transform the Fund, for the first time, into a universal 
institution, but also will place it at the center of one of the 
most unprecedented processes of transition. Also intriguing will be 
how flexible the institution will be in dealing with all these 
extraordinary challenges posed by its universalization. Meanwhile, 
to guide it through this uncharted territory, the members of the 
Board have asked the Managing Director, Michel Camdessus to stay 
for five more years.

